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The General Services Administration accesses building-automation system 
technology that runs federal facility processes such as HVAC, lighting, elevators, and 
access control via active Internet connections. Currently, these networks are not secure, 
despite legislation requiring them to be. 
This thesis investigated whether the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
could leverage existing federal laws, presidential directives, executive orders, 
government frameworks, and its current cyber and investigative capabilities to establish a 
strategy to secure federal facility building-automation system cyber networks, or if 
additional resources are needed The research uncovered significant vulnerabilities and 
threats to federal facility building-automation system networks, which, if exploited, could 
cause a significant impact on the American people, who are dependent on services 
offered by federal agencies such as the Department of Veterans Affairs and the Social 
Security Administration.  
A qualitative research method was used to interpret and analyze government and 
nongovernment institutional studies and reports, existing cybersecurity frameworks, and 
scholarly journals to determine which of the policy options offered would provide the 
best strategy for the DHS moving forward. The thesis concluded that utilizing a 
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In 2007, Congress passed the Energy Independence and Security Act, directing all 
government agencies to reduce their buildings’ energy levels by 30 percent by 2015.1 
Accordingly, the General Services Administration (GSA), responsible for managing 
federal facilities, began taking the necessary steps to accomplish this goal.2 In 2012, to 
reduce energy costs and improve performance, GSA began retrofitting 50 of the most 
energy-inefficient federal facilities.3 This retrofit included networking facility building 
automation systems (BAS)—a type of industrial control system (ICS) to the Internet—to 
give “property managers real-time information and diagnostic tools that keep facilities 
working at peak efficiency.”4 These BAS networks control such actions as HVAC, 
facility lighting, and elevators.5 Although this technology has created both a 
centralization of control and a level of convenience for GSA property managers and 
building engineers, allowing them to perform facility maintenance from the click of a 
mouse, it has also made the facilities vulnerable to cyber intrusions due to their active 
Internet connections. 
Currently, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is not monitoring BAS 
networks, investigating network intrusions, or conducting risk assessments of BAS 
networks inside GSA-owned facilities, despite current presidential executive orders 
(E.O.s) and federal laws such as the Federal Information Security Management Act of 
2002 (FISMA), requiring federal networks be secured.6 DHS and the GSA are the 
agencies responsible for the Government Facilities Sector (GFS), one of the 16 critical 
                                                 
1 Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110–140 Stat. 1596 (2007)  
2 Federal Green Buildings, U.S. House of Representatives, 111th Cong., (statement by Kevin 
Kampschroer, Director Office of Federal High-Performance Green Buildings). 
3 “New Smart Building Technology to Increase Federal Buildings Energy Efficiency,” General 
Services Administration, May 12, 2012, http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/135115. 
4 Ibid. 
5 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Federal Facility Cybersecurity: DHS and GSA Should 
Address Cyber Risk to Building and Access Control Systems (GAO-15-6) (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, 2014), 10, http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/667512.pdf. 
6 Ibid., 17. 
 xvi 
infrastructure sectors outlined in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP); the 
GSA is ultimately responsible for federal facility BAS security.7 
Currently, there is insufficient collaboration within the DHS with respect to 
securing federal facility BAS networks, despite well-known threats and vulnerabilities 
such as password-management deficiencies, unsubstantial intrusion detection, and 
inferior private-sector network monitoring.8 Though the reason for the DHS’s lack of 
collaboration is unknown, it may be because the Department has not yet seen that these 
networks operating in federal facilities are susceptible to penetration and subsequent 
exploitation. This has likely led to poor motivation within the DHS and GSA to address 
the issue. Other potential factors could be limited resources—no trained personnel and 
budget constraints—and confusion related to jurisdiction or authority. Finally, existing 
federal laws, presidential EOs, and cybersecurity frameworks may not be sufficient to 
provide the necessary roadmap for collaboration between federal agency stakeholders to 
secure federal facility BAS networks. 
There are both tangible and intangible consequences related to a cyberattack upon 
a federal facility BAS. First, disruption in HVAC, lighting, or elevator operations could 
cause facility closure until the problem is resolved, creating a backlog for government 
entitlement agencies such as the Social Security Administration and the Department of 
Veterans Affairs. Second, if the HVAC system were tampered with, increasing 
temperatures in the facility could render individual agencies’ network servers inoperable 
or, worse, could cause health and safety concerns for the young and elderly. Third, if an 
attacker surreptitiously enters a BAS network, the attacker could subsequently gain 
access to the GSA.gov network, potentially compromising personally identifiable 
information (PII) of GSA customers (the rest of the federal government). Finally, if a 
federal facility BAS network attack became public, confidence in government would 
                                                 
7 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP 2013) 




8 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Federal Facility Cybersecurity, 22. 
 xvii 
likely be further eroded; A June 2014 Gallup poll found that more than 70 percent of the 
American people have already lost confidence in the federal government.9  
This thesis examines current legislation and DHS cyber capabilities, and answers 
the primary research question: 
• How can the DHS leverage existing federal laws, presidential directives, 
executive orders, and frameworks, and its current cyber and investigative 
capabilities to establish a strategy to secure federal facility building-
automation system networks? 
The following secondary research questions are answered to properly address the 
primary research question: 
• If existing resources are not sufficient, what additional resources should be 
obtained to mitigate the risks? 
• How should the DHS leverage its components’ law enforcement 
authorities to augment technical cyber defense measures?  
The current DHS strategy to secure federal facility BAS is nonexistent; however, 
both the DHS and GSA have recently agreed to work together to develop a strategy.10 
There are many challenges associated with increasing cybersecurity within the federal 
government, and specifically within cybersecurity of federal facility BAS networks. 
Some challenges include determining if existing laws are sufficient to prosecute bad 
actors, finding the balance between security and privacy, determining roles and 
responsibilities for government agencies, addressing lack of trained personnel, and 
planning for the constantly changing nature of the threat. This thesis analyzes the current 
roadblocks to achieving security of BAS networks inside federal facilities, cybersecurity 
law and legal authorities the federal government already possesses to secure federal 
facility BAS networks, and the DHS and GSA responsibilities in this effort. 
Perhaps the biggest roadblock to securing federal facility BAS is the DHS and 
GSA’s lack of control over the contractors currently maintaining most BAS networks. As 
of March 2015, approximately three hundred federal facility BAS networks are housed 
                                                 
9 Justin McCarthy, “Americans Losing Confidence in All Branches of U.S. Gov’t,” Gallup, June 20, 
2014, http://www.gallup.com/poll/171992/americans-losing-confidence-branches-gov.aspx. 
10 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Federal Facility Cybersecurity, Appendix III, IV. 
 xviii 
on the GSA network, and protected behind the GSA firewall; the remaining facilities are 
operated on private contractor networks.11 While GSA is in the process of moving these 
facilities over to their network, until this happens, these networks are essentially beyond 
the control of the government.  
Another roadblock the DHS faces is that it does not currently have sufficient 
technical expertise to assess these networks on a broad scale, nor to investigate possible 
intrusions for eventual prosecution of bad actors, with the lone exception of the United 
States Secret Service (USSS).12 The Industrial Control System Cyber Emergency 
Response Team (ICS-CERT) informed the author they have less than 30 personnel who 
are trained to respond to cybersecurity incidents of ICS networks and they lack law 
enforcement authority. Conversely, the Federal Protective Service (FPS) has the 
necessary law enforcement authority and responsibility to protect federal facilities, yet 
lacks the technical expertise to perform cybersecurity duties.13 Currently, the only DHS 
component with both law enforcement authority to conduct criminal investigations and 
ICS forensic expertise is the USSS.14 The Secret Service, however, is not currently 
conducting any investigative activity related to GSA-owned facility BAS network 
intrusions. 
Five options are offered in this inquiry and were assessed using five categories: 
DHS acceptability, compliance (with laws and presidential executive orders and 
directives), ease of implementation, overall effectiveness, and time needed to implement 
                                                 
11 Josh Mordin and Sandy Schadchehr, “Building Monitoring and Control Systems in GSA,” 
presented at the Cybersecurity Building Control Systems Workshop, Washington, DC, March 24, 2015  
12 Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Investing in 
Cybersecurity: Understanding Risks and Building Capabilities for the Future (statement by Special Agent 
in Charge William Noonan, May 7, 2014. 
13 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Federal Facility Cybersecurity, 5, 18. 
14 Fighting Fraud: Improving Information Security: Joint Hearing Before the House Subcommittee on 
Financial Institutions And Consumer Credit of the Committee on Financial Services, 108th Cong., 1(2003) 
(statement of Tim Caddigan, Special Agent in Charge, Financial Crimes Division, United States Secret 
Service). 
 xix 
the option.15 A subsequent comparative analysis was completed to discover which option 
earned the highest ratings.  
The comparative analysis findings demonstrated that the DHS should adopt and 
implement Option IV(A) by initially utilizing experienced, cleared private contractors, 
overseen by FPS, to perform risk assessments and network analysis of federal facility 
BAS. Additionally, Option IV(A) calls for the DHS to direct the USSS to provide 
incident response for network intrusions, as well as subsequent forensically sound 
criminal investigations into the discovered intrusions. Once the FPS has established their 
own cybersecurity capability, the agency would be charged with taking over the mission 
completely. This option provides an almost immediate, cost-effective risk mitigation 
strategy to reduce the vulnerabilities identified in Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) report 15–6. 
 
                                                 
15 Todd R. Consolini, “Regional Security Assessments: A Regional Approach to Securing Federal 
Facilities” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009). 
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In 2007, Congress passed the Energy Independence and Security Act, directing all 
government agencies to reduce their buildings’ energy levels by 30 percent by 2015.1 
Accordingly, the General Services Administration (GSA), responsible for managing 
federal facilities, began taking the necessary steps to accomplish this goal.2 In 2012, to 
reduce energy costs and improve performance, GSA began retrofitting 50 of the most 
energy-inefficient federal facilities.3 This retrofit included networking facility building 
automation systems (BAS)—a type of industrial control system (ICS) to the Internet—to 
give “property managers real-time information and diagnostic tools that keep facilities 
working at peak efficiency.”4 All new federal facility construction will employ BAS 
network technology. These BAS networks control such actions as HVAC, facility 
lighting, and elevators.5 Although this technology has created both a centralization of 
control and a level of convenience for GSA property managers and building engineers, 
allowing them to perform facility maintenance from the click of a mouse, it has also 
made the facilities vulnerable to cyber intrusions due to their active Internet connections. 
Currently, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is not monitoring BAS 
networks, investigating network intrusions, or conducting risk assessments of BAS 
networks inside GSA-owned facilities, despite current presidential executive orders 
(E.O.s) and federal laws, such as the Federal Information Security Management Act of 
2002 (FISMA), requiring federal networks be secured.6 The DHS and GSA are 
designated as the co-sector-specific agencies responsible for the Government Facilities 
                                                 
1 Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140 Stat. 1596 (2007). 
2 Federal Green Buildings, U.S. House of Representatives, 111th Cong., (statement by Kevin 
Kampschroer, Director Office of Federal High-Performance Green Buildings). 
3 “New Smart Building Technology to Increase Federal Buildings Energy Efficiency,” General 
Services Administration, May 12, 2012, http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/135115. 
4 Ibid. 
5 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Federal Facility Cybersecurity: DHS and GSA Should 
Address Cyber Risk to Building and Access Control Systems (GAO-15-6) (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, 2010), 10, http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/667512.pdf. 
6 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Federal Facility Cybersecurity, 17. 
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Sector (GFS), one of the 16 critical infrastructure sectors outlined in the National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), and are ultimately responsible for federal facility 
BAS security.7 The NIPP lists cybersecurity for critical infrastructure and key resources 
(CIKR), such as industrial control system (ICS), as a critical point of vulnerability in the 
U.S. industrial infrastructure.8 
Additionally, Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-7, superseded by 
PPD-21, directed the DHS to produce a national plan to protect CIKR, and designated the 
DHS as a national focal point for securing cyberspace.9 To streamline this effort, the 
National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD), a subcomponent of the DHS, 
established the Control Systems Security Program (CSSP). The CSSP is responsible for 
maintaining a partnership between the federal government and private industry to reduce 
cyber threats to private sector BAS/ICS; this program, however, does not address federal 
facility BAS, leaving a significant gap in federal facility BAS network security.10 
Currently, there is insufficient collaboration within the DHS with respect to 
securing federal facility BAS networks, despite well-known threats and vulnerabilities 
such as password-management deficiencies, unsubstantial intrusion detection, and 
inferior private-sector network monitoring.11 Though the reason for the DHS’s lack of 
collaboration is unknown, it may be because the Department has not yet seen that these 
networks operating in federal facilities are susceptible to penetration and subsequent 
exploitation. This has likely led to poor motivation within the DHS and GSA to address 
the issue. Other potential factors could be limited resources—limited trained personnel 
                                                 
7 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP 2013) 




8 Ibid., 12. 
9 President of the United States, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7: Critical Infrastructure 
Identification, Prioritization, and Protection (HSPD-7) (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, 2003), http://www.dhs.gov/homeland-security-presidential-directive-7.  
10 Office of Inspector General, DHS Can Make Improvements to Secure Industrial Control Systems 
(OIG-13-39) (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013), 3, 
https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2013/OIG_13-39_Feb13.pdf.  
11 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Federal Facility Cybersecurity, 22. 
 3 
and budget constraints—and confusion related to jurisdiction or authority. Finally, 
existing federal laws, presidential EOs, and cybersecurity frameworks may not be 
sufficient to provide the necessary roadmap for collaboration between federal agency 
stakeholders to secure federal facility BAS networks. 
There are both tangible and intangible consequences related to a cyberattack upon 
a federal facility BAS. First, disruption in HVAC, lighting, or elevator operations could 
cause facility closure until the problem is resolved, creating a backlog for government 
entitlement agencies such as the Social Security Administration and the Department of 
Veterans Affairs. Second, if the HVAC system were tampered with, increasing 
temperatures in the facility could render individual agencies’ network servers inoperable 
or, worse, could cause health and safety concerns for the young and elderly. Third, if an 
attacker surreptitiously enters a BAS network,  the attacker could subsequently gain 
access to the GSA.gov network, potentially compromising personally identifiable 
information (PII) of GSA customers (the rest of the federal government). Finally, if a 
federal facility BAS network attack became public, confidence in government would 
likely be further eroded; A June 2014 Gallup poll found that more than 70 percent of the 
American people have already lost confidence in the federal government.12  
A. EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL FACILITY SECURITY 
In 1995, over one million federal employees worked in approximately 1,330 
GSA-owned or leased facilities, and the numbers are remarkably similar today.13 Before 
the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City on April 19, 
1995, no formal security standards for federally owned or leased facilities existed.14 In 
the aftermath, President Clinton charged the Department of Justice with determining if 
federal facilities were vulnerable to violence or terrorism, and to “develop 
                                                 
12 McCarthy, “Americans Losing Confidence.” 
13 United States Marshals Service, Vulnerability Assessment of Federal Facilities (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Department of Justice, 1995), Introduction, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/ 
156412NCJRS.pdf. 
14 Lorraine H. Tong, Federal Building and Facility Security (CRS Report No. R41138) (Washington, 
DC: Congressional Research Service, 2010), 1. 
 4 
recommendations for minimum security standards.”15 The GSA and the U.S. Marshals 
Service conducted over 1,200 physical security assessments at federal facilities in order 
to determine what building upgrades would be necessary in order to comply with the 
minimum standards proposed.16  
Recommendations such as improving access control, occupant emergency plans, 
and intelligence sharing were made.17 Facilities were also grouped by security levels, 
ranging from V (the most secure) to I (the least secure), and minimal standards for each 
level were established.18 All executive branch agencies were subsequently directed by 
President Clinton “to begin upgrading their facilities to meet the recommended minimum 
security standards.”19 The GSA was also required to “establish Building Security 
Committees for all of its facilities.”20 These committees meet on an as-needed basis to 
discuss security-related matters, such as if existing countermeasures are sufficient. 
On October 19, 1995, the Interagency Security Committee (ISC) was established 
through Executive Order 12977.21 The ISC was chaired by the GSA Administrator until 
2003, when the chairmanship transferred to the Secretary of the DHS. E.O. 12977 
charged the ISC with the responsibilities outlined in Figure 1. 
  
                                                 
15 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Building Security: Interagency Security Committee Has 
Had Limited Success in Fulfilling its Responsibilities (GAO-02-1004) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2002), 5. 
16 Tong, Federal Building and Facility Security, 1. 
17 United States Marshals Service. Vulnerability Assessment of Federal Facilities. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Tong, Federal Building and Facility Security, 1. 
20 Ibid. 
21 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Homeland Security: Further Actions Needed to Coordinate 
Federal Agencies’ Facility Protection Efforts and Promote Key Practices (GAO-05-49) (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2004). 
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Figure 1.  ISC Responsibilities Mandated by E.O. 12977 
 
Adapted from U.S. Government Accountability Office, Homeland Security: Further 
Actions Needed to Coordinate Federal Agencies’ Facility Protection Efforts and Promote 
Key Practices (GAO-05-49) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 
2004); Exec. Order No. 12977, “Interagency Security Committee,” 60 C.F.R. (54411–
54412), 54412. 
Since the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, federal facilities and employees 
continue to be attacked and threatened. For example, in 2010, an anti-IRS extremist flew 
his single-engine Piper aircraft into an IRS facility in Austin, Texas, destroying the 
facility and killing one IRS employee.22 In 2013, a mentally disturbed Department of 
Defense (DOD) civilian employee killed 12 people at the Washington Navy Yard with a 
shotgun.23 Since 2014, the federal government has been warning law enforcement about 
                                                 
22 Michael Brick, “Man Crashes Plane into Texas IRS Office,” New York Times, February 19, 2010. 
23 Peter Hermann and Ann E. Marimow, “Navy Yard Shooter Aaron Alexis Driven By Delusions,” 
Washington Post, September 25, 2013. 
 
1. Establish policies for security in and protection of Federal facilities 
2. Develop and evaluate security standards for Federal facilities, develop a strategy for 
ensuring compliance with such standards, and oversee the implementation of 
appropriate security measures in Federal facilities 
3. Take such actions as may be necessary to enhance the quality and effectiveness of 
security and protection of Federal facilities, including but not limited to: 
a. encouraging agencies with security responsibilities to share security-related 
intelligence in a timely and cooperative manner 
b. assessing technology and information systems as a means of providing cost-
effective improvements to security in Federal facilities 
c. developing long-term construction standards for those locations with threat 
levels or missions that require blast resistant structures or other specialized 
security requirements 
d. evaluating standards for the location of, and special security related to, day 
care centers in Federal facilities 
e. assisting the Administrator in developing and maintaining a centralized 
security data base of all Federal facilities 
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the Islamic State’s intentions to kill government employees.24 These incidents show that 
the threat to federal facilities and employees is in no danger of dissipating any time soon. 
Since the creation of the ISC, federal facility security has remained an important 
issue for Congress, as evident by the many hearings and requested Congressional 
Research Service (CRS) and Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports regarding 
security deficiencies at federal facilities. These reports have consistently found that 
federal facility security is not adequate. Insufficient contract security guard training, FPS 
risk assessment methodology, and lack of coordination among federal agencies have been 
recurring themes throughout these reports. Additionally, the DHS Office of Inspector 
General (DHS-OIG) has identified deficiencies with how FPS protects federal facilities.25 
In 2014, the GAO highlighted that federal facilities are vulnerable to cyberattacks 
through facility BAS networks.26 The GAO report found that adequate risk assessments 
were not being conducted, and the DHS had no strategy to secure these networks. Until 
October 1, 2014, the DHS did not provide adequate guidance for federal agencies to 
report computer security incidents related to ICS.27 Additionally, the GAO found that the 
DHS, through the ISC, had not included cybersecurity threats in the ISC-produced 
Design-Basis Threat (DBT) report.28 The DBT outlines the “characteristics of the threat 
environment to be used in conjunction with all ISC standards.”29 The DHS could 
leverage lessons learned in federal facility physical security over the last 20 years and 
apply them to this new cyber risk to federal facilities. 
                                                 
24 “Feds Warn of Possible ISIS-Inspired Attacks on Police, Government Officials, Media,” Fox News, 
October 14, 2014, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/10/14/feds-dhs-warn-possible-isis-attacks-on-
cops-government-officials-media/. 
25 Office of Inspector General, Federal Protective Service: Contract Guard Procurement and 
Oversight Process Challenges (OIG-09-51) (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
2009), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_09-51_Apr09.pdf. 
26 U.S. Government Accountability Office. Federal Facility Cybersecurity, 17. 
27 Ibid. 
28 U.S. Government Accountability Office. Federal Facility Cybersecurity, 19. 
29 Ibid. 
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B. THREATS AND VULNERABILITIES TO BAS/ICS 
The networks that comprise the Internet were built for convenience and ease of 
use, not for security.30 The 1997 Presidential Commission on Critical Infrastructure 
Protection claimed, “The day may be coming when an enemy can attack us from a 
distance, using cyber tools without first confronting our military power and with a good 
chance of going undetected. The new geography is borderless cyber geography whose 
major topographical features are technology and change.”31 That day has already come, 
and attacks against BAS/ICS are constantly occurring.32 During FY 2014, the United 
States Computer Emergency Response Team (US-CERT) processed 52,367 cybersecurity 
incidents for federal agencies.33 These incidents included denial of service attacks, 
improper usage, unauthorized access, social engineering, phishing, malicious code 
installation or execution, and suspicious network activity.34 While these statistics do not 
address BAS specifically, they do highlight that federal government networks in general 
are under constant attack.  
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) uses the term 
industrial control system (ICS) to generally describe several types of control systems. 
These control systems include building automation systems (BAS), and many others. 
Often, BAS technologies are used in critical infrastructure industries to provide for a 
centralized location to manage remotely or on site to multiple facility systems, such as 
HVAC, access control, elevators, lighting, security countermeasures, and fire 
                                                 
30 Paul Rosenzweig, Cyber Warfare: How Conflicts in Cyberspace Are Challenging America and 
Changing the World (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2013). 
31 President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, Critical Foundations: Protecting 
America’s Infrastructures (Washington, DC: White House, 1997). 
32 Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team, ICS-CERT Year in Review 2012 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2012), https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/sites/default/ 
files/documents/Year_in_Review_FY2012_Final.pdf. 
33 Office of Management and Budget, Annual Report to Congress: Federal Information Security 
Management Act (Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President, 2015), 14, 16, 17, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/egov_docs/
final_fy14_fisma_report_02_27_2015.pdf. 
34 Ibid., 15. 
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suppression.35 Facility BAS were originally implemented as isolated, separate networks; 
today, however, many of these BAS are accessible to anyone with an Internet connection, 
thus placing them at risk for exploitation.36 
Threats to BAS/ICS can come from a variety of sources, including terrorists, 
criminals, malicious actors, insider threats (disgruntled employees), foreign governments, 
human error, equipment failure, and natural disasters.37 There are many reasons for the 
escalating risk control systems face,  including: (1) the move from proprietary software 
platforms to “the adoption of standardized technologies with known vulnerabilities,” such 
as Microsoft Windows, (2) “the connectivity of control systems to other networks,” such 
as BAS networks integrated within the GSA enterprise network, (3) “constraints on the 
implementation of existing security technologies and practices,” such as poor password 
management programs, (4) insecure remote connections, such as those that may be in use 
by the private contractors who maintain the majority of federal facility BAS networks, 
and (5) “the widespread availability of technical information about control systems” on 
the Internet.38 
The GAO found that control systems can be vulnerable to successful cyber-
attacks if threat actors execute one or more of the following actions to conduct the attack: 
• disrupt the operation of control systems by delaying or blocking the flow 
of information through control networks, thereby denying availability of 
the networks to control system operators 
• make unauthorized changes to programmed instructions in controllers, 
change alarm thresholds, or issue unauthorized commands to control 
equipment, which could potentially result in damage to equipment (if 
tolerances are exceeded), premature shutdown of processes (such as 
                                                 
35 Keith Stouffer, NIST Briefing: ICS Cybersecurity Guidance—NIST SP 800-82, Guide to ICS 
Security (Gaithersburg, MD: National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2013), 
http://www.businessofsecurity.com/docs/BOS_NIST%20ICS%20Briefing_Keith%20Stouffer%208-28-
13.pdf.  
36 Alex Salkever, “If These Networks Get Hacked, Beware,” Business Week, September 15, 2003, 
http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2003-09-15/if-these-networks-get-hacked-beware. 
37 Stouffer, NIST Briefing. 
38 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Challenges in Securing 
Control Systems (GAO-04-140T) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2003), 11, 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/120/110405.pdf.  
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prematurely shutting down transmission lines), or even disabling of 
control equipment 
• send false information to control system operators either to disguise 
unauthorized changes or to initiate inappropriate actions by system 
operators 
• modify the control system software, producing unpredictable results 
• interfere with the operation of safety systems39 
Federal facility BAS networks face both unintentional and intentional threats that 
can be targeted or nontargeted.40 Unintentional threats to BAS can cause disruptions 
from software updates or improper maintenance procedures.41 An intentional threat 
includes both nontargeted and targeted attacks.42 A nontargeted attack is achieved when a 
threat actor releases a worm, malware, or virus with no specific target.43 A targeted 
attack occurs when an individual or group attacks a specific system at a specific 
location.44 A successful cyber-attack on a federal facility BAS/ICS could result in 
physical damage if a facility’s HVAC system is tampered with, causing server rooms to 
overheat. Loss of life could also occur if the facility’s fire suppression system is disabled. 
Loss of federal employee productivity could be substantial if the facility is forced to 
close, and could disrupt government benefits for the nation’s veterans and social security 
recipients.45  
The FBI remains concerned about the potential threat disgruntled insiders pose to 
government networks.46 Often, these insiders have unrestricted access and can steal 
assets or cause damage without significant knowledge of computer-network intrusion 
                                                 
39 U.S. Government Accountability Office. Critical Infrastructure Protection, 14. 
40 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Multiple Efforts to Secure Control Secure Control Systems 
Are Under Way, but Challenges Remain (GAO-07-1036) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2007), 12, http://www.gao.gov/assets/270/268137.pdf. 
41 Ibid.  
42 Ibid.  
43 Ibid.  
44 Ibid.  
45 Office of Inspector General, DHS Can Make Improvements to Secure Industrial Control Systems. 
46 U.S. Government Accountability Office. Critical Infrastructure Protection, 7. 
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techniques.47 Although there have been no publically disclosed cyber-attacks perpetrated 
against a federal facility BAS owned by GSA, successful cyber-attacks have already been 
perpetrated against many other ICS and specifically BAS, and will be discussed in further 
detail later in this chapter. 
In 2012, the Industrial Control System Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-
CERT) “tracked 171 unique vulnerabilities affecting 55 ICS products.”48 Complicating 
matters, much information on BAS/ICS design and their locations is publicly available 
over the Internet.49 Additionally, “many former employees, vendors, contractors, and 
other end users of the same ICS equipment worldwide who have inside knowledge about 
the operation of control systems and their processes.”50 This knowledge could be used to 
exploit known vulnerabilities within the security of these systems.51 
Research shows that it is possible for attackers using publicly available 
information, and with “very little knowledge of control systems to gain unauthorized 
access to a control system with the use of automated attack and data mining tools and a 
factory-set default password.”52 It is up to the users to change default passwords, and 
many never do.53 Once passwords are reset, the attacker could “lock-out” system 
operators and alter the control system.54 Since 2010, ICS-CERT has been warning critical 
infrastructure operators of the existence of Shodan—a search engine used to discover 
Internet-facing BAS/ICS systems throughout the world.55 Once BAS/ICS are discovered 
                                                 
47 U.S. Government Accountability Office. Critical Infrastructure Protection, 7. 
48 ICS-Cert Monitor, October/November/December 2012: 6, https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/sites/default/ 
files/Monitors/ICS-CERT_Monitor_Oct-Dec2012.pdf 
49 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection. 
50 Keith Stouffer, Joe Falco, and Karen Scarfone, Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security 
(NIST Special Publication 800-82) (Gaithersburg, MD: National Institute of Standards and Technology, 
2011), 3–16, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-82/SP800-82-final.pdf. 
51 Stouffer, Falco, and Scarfone, Guide to ICS Security. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Stouffer, Falco, and Scarfone, Guide to ICS Security, 14. 
54 Ibid., 15 
55 Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team, Control System Internet Accessibility 
(ICS-ALERT-10-301-01) (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security), http://ics-cert.us-
cert.gov/alerts/ICS-ALERT-10-301-01. 
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using Shodan, it is possible for an unauthorized user to access the control system and 
make changes to the system remotely over the Internet.56 Although Shodan continues to 
be an issue, at the urging of the DHS, some of these vulnerabilities in private-sector 
systems have been eliminated.57 This threat may be further heighten for federal facilities 
that house national security agencies due to the cyber capabilities of nation states such as 
China and Russia.  
The GSA’s failure to write effective memorandums of agreement (MOA) with the 
contractors who maintain some federal facility BAS networks has left the government 
with a complete lack of knowledge about specific vulnerabilities that exist on these 
networks, or whether trespasses, intrusion attempts, or actual intrusions have occurred. 
Although general ICS network vulnerabilities are well documented, as are the threats the 
networks face from adversaries, successful attacks have already been perpetrated against 
BAS/ICS. 
Perhaps the most widely reported attack against a BAS/ICS came in 2010 with the 
public disclosure of the Stuxnet computer worm. Stuxnet was reportedly used to cause an 
Iranian uranium enrichment facility to malfunction, delaying Iran’s ability to produce 
uranium, presumably used for the creation of a nuclear weapon.58 “This sea-change in 
cyber vulnerability is reminiscent of the transformative changes that attended the 
explosion of the first atomic bomb.”59 Stuxnet eventually found its way into the networks 
of critical infrastructure providers from Germany to India and is now publicly available.60 
If a federal facility BAS/ICS became infected by the Stuxnet worm, related disruptions 
could conceivably affect the federal government’s ability to provide essential services to 
                                                 
56 Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team, Control System Internet 
Accessibility. 
57 ICS-Cert Monitor, October/November/December 2012. 
58 Michael B. Kelly, “The Stuxnet Attack on Iran’s Nuclear Plant Was ‘Far More Dangerous’ Than 
Previously Thought,” Business Insider, November 20, 2012, http://www.businessinsider.com/stuxnet-was-
far-more-dangerous-than-previous-thought-2013-11. 
59 Rosenzweig, Cyber Warfare, 2, 7. 
60 Dennis Fisher and Paul Roberts, “Threat Post: Stuxnet,” Kaspersky Lab, accessed October 21, 2015, 
http://usa.kaspersky.com/sites/usa.kaspersky.com/files/TP-Spotlight-Stuxnet.pdf. 
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citizens dependent on agencies such as the Social Security Administration and 
Department of Veterans Affairs for a considerable amount of time.61 
While it is difficult to argue the inconveniences federal employees and visitors to 
federal facilities could experience resulting from a disruption to a BAS—such as elevator 
failure, fire suppression system activations, and temperature fluctuations—there are 
potentially life-threatening consequences as well. “In March 1997, a teenager in 
Worcester, Massachusetts used a dial-up modem” connected to a public-switched 
telephone network to disable the telephone network system.62 His actions rendered phone 
service inoperable at several Worcester airport facilities, including “the control tower, 
airport security, the airport fire department, the weather service” and all airlines located 
at the airport.63 Additionally, “the tower’s main radio transmitter and another transmitter 
that activates runway lights were shut down, as well as a printer that controllers use to 
monitor flight progress.”64 The attack shut down telephone service for businesses and 
approximately 600 homes in a nearby town.65 
In January 2012, using open-source information, ICS-CERT identified and 
responded to a cyber-intrusion affecting the heating and air conditioning at an unnamed 
GFS facility.66 The facility’s personnel reported they discovered unauthorized changes 
had been made to the Energy Management System control settings, resulting in warmer 
than normal temperatures inside the facility.67 As a result of the discovery, facility 
personnel reset the system settings to normal values and assured the BAS/ICS was no 
                                                 
61 Paul Kerr, John Rollins, and Catherine Theohary, The Stuxnet Computer Worm: Harbinger of an 
Emerging Warfare Capability (CRS Report R41524) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 
2010), http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R41524_20101209.pdf. 









longer accessible via the Internet.68 ICS-CERT determined an unauthorized user had 
changed the temperature via the Internet, despite the BAS/ICS requiring a password for 
remote login.69 ICS-CERT informed the author the attack occurred at a law enforcement 
crime lab. It is unknown if any evidence was compromised as a result of the attack; 
however, it is clear the potential was there. On the surface, these actions appear only to 
affect general comfort. Further analysis, however, indicates a potential for a significant 
loss of productivity, if employees were sent home until the problem was resolved. 
In 2012, a cybersecurity company initiated a mock ICS that mimicked a water-
pump network connected to the Internet to determine vulnerabilities within the 
network.70 The existence of the ICS water-pump station was quickly discovered by 
hackers, who began to tamper with the system.71 Researchers from the cybersecurity 
company began collecting data to determine how often and from where targeted attacks 
originated. Analysis indicated 12 attempts to shut down the water pump and five attempts 
to modify the pump’s processes were made from multiple countries; approximately 33 
percent of the attacks originated in China, followed by 19 percent in the United States.72 
The remaining attacks were carried out by people in Russia, Laos, and the Palestinian 
territories.73 President Obama’s International Strategy for Cyberspace, released in 2011, 
broadly indicates the national security and diplomatic implications of confirmed state-
sponsored cyber-attack against the United States could be significant, potentially leading 
to economic and or diplomatic ramifications for the country that carried out the attack.74 
                                                 
68 “Government Facilities Sector,” ICS-CERT Monthly Monitor, (February 2012). 
69 Ibid. 
70 John Leyden, “SCADA Honeypots Attract Swarm of International Hackers,” The Register, March 
20, 2013, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/03/20/scada_honeypot_research/. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Leyden, “SCADA Honeypots.” 
74 President of the United States, International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security, and 
Openness in a Networked World (Washington, DC: White House, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/ 
default/files/rss_viewer/international_strategy_for_cyberspace.pdf. 
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C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis examines current legislation and DHS cyber capabilities, and answers 
the following primary research question: 
• How can the DHS leverage existing federal laws, presidential directives, 
executive orders, frameworks, and its current cyber and investigative 
capabilities to establish a strategy to secure federal facility building-
automation system networks? 
The following secondary research questions are answered to properly address the 
primary research question: 
• If existing resources are not sufficient, what additional resources should be 
obtained to mitigate the risks? 
• How should the DHS leverage its components’ law enforcement 
authorities to augment technical cyber defense measures?  
D. METHODOLOGY 
By analyzing policy options, this thesis examines legislation, executive orders, 
presidential directives, and government frameworks to determine if the DHS more 
broadly, has the legal authority to secure federal facility BAS. Analysis of specific DHS 
components such as the USSS and the NPPD and its subcomponents—ICS-CERT, FPS, 
and NCCIC—was conducted to determine if the DHS can secure federal facility BAS 
with existing resources or if additional resources are required. 
There are well over 200,000 federal facilities around the world currently 
employing building-automation system technology, some owned and some leased. This 
thesis only addresses non-DOD federal facilities owned by the GSA. This limitation 
reduces the number of facilities affected by this inquiry from over 200,000 to 
approximately 1,500. This thesis does not attempt to prove the networks that control 
building automation systems are vulnerable; it is widely accepted by cybersecurity 
experts that if a network is connected to the Internet, then the network is vulnerable to 
cyber-attacks.75 Additionally, because no entity is assessing the security of these specific 
                                                 
75 “The Importance of Cyber Hygiene in Cyberspace,” INFOSEC Institute, April 30, 2015, 
http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/the-importance-of-cyber-hygiene-in-cyberspace/. 
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networks, it is impossible to provide evidence proving or disproving whether they are 
secure or not.  
Sources for this project include government and academic data. Presidential 
directives, executive orders, legislation, government frameworks, regulatory publications, 
specific government agency information, and scholarly journals and books related to the 
thesis topic were used to support the research. No surveys or interviews were included in 
the research. At the conclusion of this thesis, DHS leadership will have a clearer 
understanding of the vulnerabilities to federal facility building automation systems, as 
well as more in-depth knowledge of the Department’s authority and resources to pursue a 
strategy to secure them. 
E. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Chapter II provides a literature review summarizing existing knowledge of the 
topic. The review includes sources from the private sector, government, and academia to 
enhance understanding of current authorities to execute cybersecurity function by the 
Department of Homeland Security. 
Chapter III evaluates the current status of federal facility BAS network security. 
Despite clear legal authorities, a ready-made framework, and congressional pressure to 
develop a strategy to secure these networks, roadblocks exist. Maintaining the status quo 
means federal facilities remain vulnerable and the potential consequences could be 
devastating. 
Chapter IV explores how existing DHS capabilities can be leveraged to secure 
BAS networks. By using the DHS’ own continuous monitoring and assessment software, 
and information sharing platforms, the DHS is well suited for this mission.  
Chapter V suggests creating a cyber-program within the FPS to incorporate risk 
assessments of BAS networks within their presidentially mandated Facility Security 
Assessments. Additionally, developing a capability to conduct criminal investigations 
into BAS network intrusions is evaluated. 
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Chapter VI examines a hybrid approach to securing federal facility BAS through 
combining existing resources such as software, incident response frameworks, and 
investigative authority, in collaboration with private sector expertise. 
Chapter VII provides comparative analysis of the options offered in Chapters IV, 
V, and VI, and each is judged by the following categories: DHS acceptability, 
compliance (laws, E.O.s, presidential directives), effectiveness, implementation, 
institutional acceptability, and time to implement the preferred option.76 This chapter 
identifies the preferred option as initially using cybersecurity contractors to perform 
network risk assessments and USSS personnel to conduct criminal investigations into 
cyber intrusions until the FPS can establish an effective program. 
  
                                                 
76 Consolini, “Regional Security Assessments.” 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The purpose of this literature review is to summarize the existing knowledge of 
cybersecurity issues for Industrial Control Systems (ICS) inside federal facilities, and 
more specifically of Building Automation Systems (BAS), which is a subset of ICS. 
Subsequently, the literature evaluated is heavily focused on the more generic term, ICS, 
and the general issues with securing them (which can also be applied to BAS in most 
instances). The sources reviewed come from federal government investigative reports, 
legislation, executive orders and presidential directives, federal government frameworks 
to secure ICS, and scholarly journals and books. 
Historically, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has focused its efforts 
on protecting private sector Industrial Control Systems (ICS), not BAS that run federal 
facility processes like HVAC, lighting, and elevators. “From fiscal year 2011 to fiscal 
year 2014, the number of cyber incidents reported to the DHS involving industrial control 
systems, which include building and access control systems, increased from 140 incidents 
to 243 incidents, an increase of 74 percent.”77 This increase in incidents highlights the 
need for DHS to develop an executable strategy in the near term. 
A. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT REPORTS  
For over 17 years, the U.S. government has been concerned with cyber-attacks 
against critical infrastructure.78 A 1997 presidential commission on critical infrastructure 
(CI) protection recognized the role of the cyber realm in CI.79 Though no evidence was 
found of an impending cyberattack on CI, the commission did not rule out that 
vulnerabilities existed, and in their findings said “that vulnerability jeopardizes our 
national security, global economic competitiveness, and domestic wellbeing.”80 The 
commission made several recommendations to improve CI cybersecurity, to include 
                                                 
77 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Federal Facility Cybersecurity, 14. 
78 Presidential Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, Critical Foundations. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid., Forward vii. 
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developing a national cyber threat warning capability, creating information-sharing 
relationships with the private sector, recruiting cybersecurity personnel, and creating 
legislation to address cybersecurity issues.81 Seventeen years later, the federal 
government is still struggling to implement many of the 1997 committee’s 
recommendations. 
Because the threat itself is still evolving, so is the literature on this topic; there is a 
split among experts on the potential consequences of a cyber-attack on CI. Early on, the 
U.S. intelligence community could not reach a consensus on the imminence and scale of 
what, at the time, was an unsubstantiated threat.82 Others believe a successful attack 
would have a significant impact, but it would be unlikely that an attack could succeed.83 
Almost all of the government documents reviewed that address ICS cybersecurity 
acknowledge the federal government owns facilities that operate ICS. However, these 
references are mostly limited to ICS that run oil, water, gas, energy, and nuclear facilities, 
not federal facilities that house such agencies as the Department of Veterans Affairs and 
the Social Security Administration.  
When ICS were originally designed, they were not intended to be connected to the 
Internet. As a result, older systems have been retrofitted to ensure network access, 
creating connections that are not optimal for cybersecurity.84 In the early days of ICS 
cybersecurity initiatives, experts were split on the possibility of a catastrophic cyber-
attack on an ICS and the potential consequences. The general consensus was that 
successful cyber-attack would not likely result in casualties, but infrastructure service 
could be disrupted while attempts were being made to regain control of the system from 
the hacker and any damage repaired.85 Experts placed even less probability of cascading 
effects of ICS failure, such as a cyber-attack causing other infrastructures to fail. When 
                                                 
81 Presidential Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, Critical Foundations, Forward vii. 
82 Barton Gellman, “Cyber-Attacks by Al Qaeda Feared,” Washington Post, June 27, 2002, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/12/AR2006061200711.html. 
83 Dana A. Shea, Critical Infrastructure: Control Systems and the Terrorist Threat (CRS Report 




viewed through the lens of federal facility BAS, the potential for a catastrophic effect is 
immense—a cyber-attack could disrupt network servers that run individual agencies, 
causing them to overheat, and rendering them inoperable. In 2014, the Social Security 
Administration estimated they would pay approximately 59 million Americans almost 
$863 billon in benefits.86 If these Americans were unable to receive their benefits, 
prohibiting them from purchasing such necessities as medication, people could die. 
In October 2002, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) cited the federal 
government’s responsibility to protect federal facilities, and specifically mentioned 
critical cyber-based systems located in those facilities.87 However, the GAO only 
provided physical security recommendations; no cybersecurity recommendations were 
made.88 As far back as 2003, the federal government was touting cybersecurity programs 
for ICS in federal facilities, implemented by the Department of Energy (DOE), 
Department of Defense (DOD), and the National Institute for Standards and Technology 
(NIST). It was not until 2014, however, that the GAO would release a report addressing 
this issue specifically for GSA-owned federal facilities.89 
By 2007, Congress became so concerned with cyber threats to ICS, they tasked 
the GAO to determine specific existing threats and vulnerabilities. The GAO was also 
tasked with understanding potential consequences of a cyber-attack, as well as identifying 
challenges to secure these systems, by determining if best practices from the private 
sector could be leveraged, and whether or not the private sector was effective in its 
efforts.90 The 2007 GAO report suggested that, in addition to the technical roadblocks, 
there were organizational roadblocks in securing ICS, including “difficulty in developing 
                                                 
86 “Social Security Basic Facts,” Social Security Administration, April 2, 2014, www.ssa.gov/news/
press/basicfacts.html. 
87 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Building Security: Security Responsibilities for Federally 
Owned and Leased Facilities (GAO-03-8) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 
2002), 14. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Shea, Critical Infrastructure; U.S. Government Accountability Office. Federal Facility 
Cybersecurity, 22. 
90 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Multiple Efforts to Secure Control Secure Control Systems, 
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a compelling business case for improving ICS security, a reluctance to share information 
on ICS incidents and division of technical responsibilities within an organization.” The 
report continued, “Until industry users of control systems have a business case to justify 
why additional security is needed, there may be little market incentive for the private 
sector to develop and implement more secure control systems.”91 Although the GAO was 
specifically referencing the challenges for the private sector, these challenges are just as 
relevant for the federal government. 
In 2009, the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) addressed the DHS’s 
progress in securing ICS in the private sector and failed to mention that these systems are 
found within federal facilities. This report, like others, improve situational awareness of 
the issue by focusing on improving cybersecurity information-sharing with the private 
sector, conducting vulnerability assessments, measuring effectiveness of private sector 
ICS cybersecurity programs, and suggesting formal training.92 
A 2014 GAO report on the cyber risks to federal facility BAS found the DHS and 
GSA are not in compliance with the Federal Information Security Management Act 
(FISMA), which requires the completion of federal facility BAS risk assessments, among 
other failures.93 Additionally, the DHS was found to have no strategy to address risks to 
BAS, because threats to these systems are “an emerging issue.”94 Prior to October 2014, 
the DHS did not include ICS on the list of systems for which federal agencies were 
required to report computer security incident occurrences, reducing the number of 
reported incidents to one.95 The report found that a cyber-attack on a BAS could affect a 
federal agency’s organizational operations, individuals, assets, reputation, and image.96 
The report identified criminal groups, corrupt employees, hackers, and terrorists as 
                                                 91 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Multiple Efforts to Secure Control Secure Control 
Systems, 20. 
92 Office of Inspector General, Challenges Remain in DHS’ Efforts to Secure Control Systems, (OIG-
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potential threat actors that could disrupt a federal facility BAS. The capabilities and 
intentions of threat actors was found to vary from political or monetary motivations to 
mischief.97  
The GAO recommended that the DHS develop a strategy in cooperation with the 
GSA that: 
• defines the problem 
• identifies the roles and responsibilities 
• analyzes the resources needed 
• identifies a methodology for assessing cyber risk to building and access 
control systems.98 
B. LEGISLATION 
The second set of literature on this topic consists of cybersecurity legislation 
passed by Congress and signed into law by the president. To answer the research 
question, it is imperative to know what laws exist (and to interpret them accurately) in 
order to determine if new or amended legislation is required to secure federal facility 
BAS networks.. 
Since the days of the Regan Administration, Congress has been concerned about 
computer security threats; until recently, however, legislation had not kept pace with the 
proliferation of these threats.99 During the last two decades, more than 50 cybersecurity-
related statutes have been enacted, although none of the statutes specifically address 
BAS.100  When FISMA was passed in 2002, it was Congress’ first major cybersecurity 
legislation affecting critical infrastructure; it was subsequently amended in 2014.101 
Approximately one month prior to FISMA’s enactment in 2002, President Bush signed 
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 into law.  
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The Department of Homeland Security was established as a result of the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002. One of the Act’s requirements was transferring the 
Federal Protective Service—which provides security to federal facilities—from GSA to 
the DHS.102 The Act also required the DHS to develop a comprehensive plan for 
securing U.S. critical infrastructure and the “physical and technological assets that 
support such systems.”103 It also required “DHS to conduct risk assessments of critical 
infrastructure to determine the risks associated with various types of terrorists attacks and 
the feasibility of counter measures.”104 Housed within the Homeland Security Act of 
2002 is the Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2002 (CEA). The CEA increased 
penalties under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, Title 18 Section 1030, for 
individuals whose “violation was intended to or had the effect of significantly interfering 
with or disrupting critical infrastructure; and whether the violation was intended to or had 
the effect of created a threat to public health or safety, or injury to any person.”105 
FISMA provided federal government agency heads with a comprehensive 
framework to assess risk to their information technology systems. It also required federal 
agencies to coordinate with the private sector and national security and law enforcement 
entities, designating NIST as the government agency responsible for developing 
cybersecurity standards for the federal government. Further, the Act required agency 
heads to create security controls to mitigate identified risks and periodically test them to 
ensure they were working effectively. Agency heads must report annually “on the 
adequacy and effectiveness of information security policies, procedures, and practices, 
and compliance with the requirements” to the Director of the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB), who must then notify Congress.106 
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Recent congressional cybersecurity legislative proposals have mostly focused on 
matters in 10 broad areas. These areas have been defined as: 
• national strategy and the role of government 
• FISMA reform 
• protection of critical infrastructure 
• information sharing and cross-sector coordination 
• breaches resulting in the theft or exposure of personal data such as 
financial information 
• cybercrime 
• privacy in the context of electronic commerce 
• international efforts 
• research and development 
• cybersecurity workforce107 
In 2014, FISMA was amended to provide the secretary of the DHS the authority 
to implement “binding operational directives” to federal government agencies.108 
FISMA’s 2014 revision is wide ranging; however, only the provisions affecting this 
inquiry were included. 2014 FISMA defines “binding operational directives” as 
“compulsory direction for the purpose of safeguarding Federal information and 
information systems from a known or reasonably suspected information security threat, 
vulnerability or risk.”109 Additionally, the Act modified federal agency reporting 
requirements to ensure federal agencies report specific information about cybersecurity 
incidents and threats. The amendment also requires the director of OMB to report cyber 
breaches to Congress within 30 days of discovery, to include “the estimated number of 
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individuals affected, the assessed risk of harm to those individuals, and when notice will 
be made to those individuals.”110 
In December 2014, President Obama signed into law the National Cybersecurity 
Protection Act (NCPA) of 2014. The Act amends the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to 
codify into law the already existing National Cybersecurity and Communications 
Integration Center located in the DHS to “carry out responsibilities of the DHS Under 
Secretary responsible for overseeing critical infrastructure protection, cybersecurity, and 
related DHS programs.”111 The Center shares real-time information on cybersecurity 
analysis, risks, incidents, and warnings for both the federal government and private sector 
across federal and nonfederal platforms.112 The Act also requires DHS, among other 
things, to “develop, maintain, and exercise adaptable cyber incident response plans to 
address cybersecurity risks to critical infrastructure.”113 This law makes it possible for 
DHS to compare malicious code signatures found in private sector ICS and subsequently 
search for these signatures inside federal facility BAS networks. Knowledge of this 
information also allows the DHS to block these codes from ever entering DHS-protected 
networks. 
The Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Act was signed into law on December 
18, 2014. The Act requires the DHS secretary to assess the status of cybersecurity 
professionals within the DHS—specifically, if the workforce is capable of meeting its 
cybersecurity mission, information on the locations of cybersecurity positions within the 
department, employee training, and which positions are performed by full-time 
Department employees, other government agencies, or contractors.114 The Act further 
requires the secretary of the DHS to develop a “comprehensive workforce strategy to 
enhance the readiness, capacity, training, recruitment, and retention of the cybersecurity 
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workforce of the Department.”115 Under the law, the secretary is required to identify 
obstacles impeding hiring and future development of the workforce, as well as 
knowledge gaps within the existing cybersecurity workforce employed by the 
Department, and a plan to overcome identified gaps.116 
From the review of available sources, it is clear the biggest disagreement 
regarding cybersecurity legislation is related to information sharing. Over the last several 
years, there has been a never-ending stream of executive orders and draft legislation 
attempting to improve information sharing between the government and the private 
sector. With the private sector owning and operating over 90 percent of critical 
infrastructure, information sharing is extremely important to both entities.117 Major 
opposition to the legislation is suspected to be related to privacy concerns, most likely 
intensified in the aftermath of Edward Snowden’s disclosures of National Security 
Agency (NSA) activity. Many private sector companies are concerned that information 
on their networks’ cyber breaches would become public, thus causing company stock 
prices to fall.118 Another area of concern is that some of the legislation allows for direct 
information sharing with the U.S. military by way of NSA.119 
C. EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVES 
Presidential executive orders (E.O) and directives related to cybersecurity of 
critical infrastructure issued by the President George W. Bush and Barack H. Obama 
Administrations contain the third set of literature that may offer a solution to the research 
question. Due to the evolution of these orders and directives, only those orders or 
directives still in effect were analyzed. 
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Executive Order 13231, Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Information Age, 
was signed on October 16, 2001. This E.O. established a protection program “to secure 
information systems for critical infrastructure” and specifically mentioned “protection of 
federal departments and agencies’ critical infrastructure,” and “the physical assets that 
support such systems.”120 The E.O. called for a voluntary public-private partnership and 
held executive department agency heads responsible for their agencies’ information 
systems’ security. Cyber threat information sharing was also included in the Order to 
manage “threat warning, analysis, and recovery of information among government 
network operation centers.”121 E.O. 13231 requires cyber incident coordination and 
response, support for law enforcement investigations into cyber incidents, and research 
and development, as well as provisions for the federal cybersecurity workforce.122 
In February 2013, Presidential Policy Directive 21, Critical Infrastructure 
Security and Resilience (PPD-21), was released.123 The Directive supersedes HSPD-7, 
and established a national policy on CI security and resilience, and identifies the secretary 
of the DHS as the lead federal coordinator. The Directive makes clear the responsibility 
to secure CI is shared among federal, state, and local entities, to include private and 
public CI operators and owners.124 The Directive identifies three strategic imperatives 
that will drive the federal government’s approach to “strengthen critical infrastructure 
security and resilience”: 
1. Refine and clarify functional relationships across the Federal Government 
to advance the national unity of effort to strengthen critical infrastructure 
security and resilience 
2. Enable effective information exchange by identifying baseline data and 
systems requirements for the federal government 
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3. Implement an integration and analysis function to inform planning and 
operations decisions regarding critical infrastructure125 
Further, the Directive ensures “all federal department and agency heads are 
responsible for the identification, prioritization, assessment, remediation, and security of 
their respective internal critical infrastructure that supports primary mission essential 
functions.”126 The FBI is identified as the lead investigative agency for attempted attacks, 
actual attacks, or sabotage perpetrated against critical infrastructure emanating from 
overseas.127 However, the Directive does not identify what federal investigative entity is 
responsible for cyber-attacks against critical infrastructure perpetrated from inside the 
United States. The FBI is also named as the agency to lead the National Cyber 
Investigative Joint Task Force (NCIJTF), which includes DHS representation. The 
Directive requires the GSA, in consultation with DHS, to “provide or support 
government-wide contracts with critical infrastructure systems and ensure that such 
contracts include audit rights for the security and resilience of critical infrastructure.”128 
In February 2015, the Interagency Security Committee (ISC) released a white 
paper to address the implementation of PPD-21. The ISC was created in 1995 when 
President Clinton signed E.O. 12977 to strengthen federal facility security in the wake of 
the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995.129 The ISC established a working group consisting 
of the DHS, GSA, and other federal agencies to “address cyber threats in relation to 
physical security measures at federal facilities.”130 The working group decided the ISC 
must include cyber threats to BAS in the ISC-produced Design Basis Threat Report 
(DBT), and develop countermeasures for them. This is likely due to the recommendations 
GAO made to the DHS secretary in December 2014.131 The DBT outlines the 31 
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undesirable events most likely to occur at a nonmilitary federal facility. Finally, the ISC 
recommended the ISC Training Subcommittee seek to advise ISC members to identify 
training programs to ensure compliance with PPD-21.132 
On January 9, 2008, a classified National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 
/Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) (known as NSPD-54/HSPD-23 was 
issued and subsequently declassified on June 5, 2014.133 The Directive requires all 
federal agencies to “provide DHS with visibility and insight into the status of their federal 
systems and shall respond to DHS direction in areas related to network security.”134 
However, the Directive makes it clear that federal agencies are still responsible to defend 
and protect their own computer networks. The DHS intrusion detection program, 
EINSTEIN, was directed to be deployed to all federal systems to enhance security for 
those systems.135 HSPD-23 also requires the DHS secretary and the attorney general to 
ensure they make adequate support available for those DHS and Department of Justice 
employees charged with deterring, disrupting, and defending against illegal computer 
activity domestically, to include the application of law enforcement capabilities.136 
D. GOVERNMENT FRAMEWORKS 
Several cybersecurity frameworks exist around the world relating to securing ICS; 
however, the fourth set of literature focuses on only two: one from the DHS and the other 
from the NIST. This is to ensure this inquiry remains consistent with existing legislation 
and E.O.s. In 2006, federal agencies established a working group to discuss issues with 
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securing control systems.137 The working group tasked its members with providing 
information on how and why they use control systems and in what ways they coordinate 
with other agencies. Twenty-eight federal agencies submitted data, including 12 sector-
specific agencies as outlined by the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP).138 
The Department, as the lead federal entity, was tasked with guiding “a cohesive effort 
between government and industry.”139 The working group reported that the Government 
Facilities Sector (GFS) shared their control system efforts; there is no indication, 
however, that GSA was present, as their efforts to incorporate a network capability into 
their BAS had not yet begun.140  
In 2009, the DHS National Cyber Security Division developed the Strategy for 
Securing Control Systems as part of the Department’s responsibility to lead and 
coordinate efforts to increase control system security for the nation’s critical 
infrastructure.141 The Strategy was developed in response to a 2007 GAO report (cited 
previously) that outlined deficiencies in ICS security.142 The Strategy created the 
Industrial Control Systems Joint Working Group  and expanded the Industrial Control 
Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT), which is tasked with 
responding to cyber incidents affecting public and private sector CI.143 The Strategy 
relies on the risk management framework contained within the NIPP and offers guidance 
on coordination, research and development, roles and responsibilities, incident response, 
information sharing, best practices, and regulation.144 Ironically, the Commercial 
Facilities Sector (CFS), which also employs BAS to control their HVAC, security 
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systems, and telecommunications functions, is cited in the Strategy for control system 
security efforts, but federal facility BAS is not.145 Approximately 8,000 GSA-leased 
facilities are located in CFS facilities.146 
In June 2011, NIST released Special Publication 800–82, Guide to Industrial 
Control Systems (ICS) Security. The NIST guide was updated in 2013 and again in May 
2015, and is recognized as the essential framework to enhance cybersecurity of ICS, 
including BAS for the private and public sectors but excluding national security 
systems.147 Included within the NIST framework are typical threats and vulnerabilities 
associated with ICS, countermeasures to mitigate them, and risk management 
practices.148  
The NIST has identified three all-embracing types of control system incidents: 
• Intentional targeted attacks such as gaining unauthorized access to files, 
performing a DoS, or spoofing emails (i.e., forging the sender’s identity 
for an email)  
• Unintentional consequences or collateral damage from worms, viruses or 
control system failures  
• Unintentional internal security consequences, such as inappropriate testing 
of operational systems or unauthorized system configuration changes149 
Although potentially the most consequential, NIST research found that targeted 
attacks are the least likely to occur and also require “detailed knowledge of the system 
and supporting infrastructure.”150 NIST determined the most likely threats to control 
systems originate from “disgruntled employees, former employees and others who have 
worked for the organization.”151 
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E. SCHOLARLY JOURNALS AND BOOKS 
ICS have evolved since they first appeared as stand-alone systems in the 
1950s.152 Today, ICS are used to “remotely monitor and control the delivery of essential 
services and products” such as water, electricity, and gas.153 Originally, security was not 
considered because they were designed as closed systems, not accessible by the Internet. 
The literature differs regarding the capabilities required to carry out a successful attack 
against an ICS. Some schools of thought believe a high level of knowledge of ICS is 
needed, while others believe attackers could randomly stumble onto an ICS network 
while attempting to target something else.154 The difference in opinion seems to be tied 
to the rapidly evolving nature of available information on ICS posted to the Internet by 
hackers. Several risk frameworks have been published by both government and industry 
and they remain remarkable similar; some schools of thought, however, consider the 
likelihood of an ICS cybersecurity incident by reviewing past records, published 
literature, experiments, and market research of vendors.155 
The integration of ICS with other corporate systems (much like GSA has done) 
means information from the BAS/ICS could be fed directly into the corporate system.156 
This was the approach hackers took in 2013 with the Target department store breach, as 
noted by Jaikumar Vijayan of Computer World magazine. Hackers stole login credentials 
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from a third-party vendor responsible for monitoring Target’s BAS and remotely entered 
their network, stealing millions of Americans’ credit card information.157 
BAS are designed to be efficient, safe, productive, and to reduce cost.158 
Ironically, due to a lack of security of federal facility BAS, maintaining those three core 
goals is in jeopardy. The literature is fairly consistent regarding the vulnerabilities facing 
BAS. These vulnerabilities are diverse but generic, such as lack of awareness relating to 
threats and system vulnerabilities, insufficient physical security of ICS, and “insertion of 
foreign devices.”159 According to Dr. David Brooks, a distinguished network security 
researcher, many BAS are designed, installed, and operated by service engineers, with 
little consideration for security.160 This is also the case for BAS in the majority of GSA-
owned facilities.161 These facilities’ BAS networks are not protected behind the GSA 
firewall, leaving them at risk.162 However, there are also generic mitigation strategies 
that can be employed to reduce the risks, such as removing BAS default usernames and 
passwords. To achieve integration within networks, BAS use open-data communications 
hardware and protocols, leaving the facilities using the technology vulnerable to both 
internal and external risks and threats.163 From a cybersecurity solutions perspective, 
BAS security is still in its infancy, as they are a relatively new technology.   
Another area of agreement among the government literature is the human factor. 
No matter how robust information security policies are, if employees do not follow them, 
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they are worthless.164 Humans working within any framework that places a burden on 
them will seek ways to make their lives easier.165 
F. CONCLUSION 
The existing research into cybersecurity of ICS has generally focused on three key 
areas: legislation and E.O.s, threats and vulnerabilities, and frameworks to establish an 
effective cybersecurity program for ICS. The literature review provides a legal 
foundation to establish a BAS cybersecurity program for federal facilities, backed by 
E.O.s. Existing DHS and NIST frameworks provide the DHS, and to an extent GSA, a 
roadmap to begin the tough work of securing these systems. 
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III. CURRENT FEDERAL FACILITY BAS NETWORK 
SECURITY 
The current DHS strategy to secure federal facility BAS is nonexistent; recently, 
however, both the DHS and GSA have agreed to work together to develop one.166 There 
are many challenges associated with increasing cybersecurity within the federal 
government, and specifically cybersecurity of federal facility BAS networks. For 
example, determining if existing laws are sufficient to prosecute bad actors, finding the 
balance between security and privacy, determining roles and responsibilities for 
government agencies, addressing lack of trained personnel, and accounting for the 
constantly changing nature of the threat have all contributed to these challenges. This 
chapter analyzes the current roadblocks to achieving security of BAS networks inside 
federal facilities, cybersecurity law and legal authorities the federal government already 
possesses to secure federal facility BAS networks, as well as the responsibilities of DHS 
and GSA in this effort. 
A. ROADBLOCKS TO SECURING FEDERAL FACILITY BAS 
A 2007 GAO report suggested that, in addition to the technical roadblocks, there 
are organizational roadblocks in securing ICS, including “difficulty in developing a 
compelling business case for improving ICS security, a reluctance to share information 
on ICS incidents and division of technical responsibilities within an organization.”167 The 
report continued, “Until industry users of control systems have a business case to justify 
why additional security is needed, there may be little market incentive for the private 
sector to develop and implement more secure control systems.”168 Although the 2007 
GAO report was specifically referencing the challenges for the private sector, the 2014 
                                                 
166 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Federal Facility Cybersecurity, Appendix III, IV. 
167 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Multiple Efforts to Secure Control Secure Control 
Systems. 2, http://www.gao.gov/assets/270/268137.pdf.  
168 Ibid. 
 36 
GAO report on cyber risks to federal facility BAS identified the same challenges for the 
federal government.169 
The difference between traditional information technology (IT) (ensuring the 
corporate network remains functioning by processing transactions and providing 
information) and operational technology (OT), (responsible for monitoring and 
controlling BAS) also presents roadblocks to securing BAS networks.170 Though the 
technologies appear similar, they are polar opposites. The two use different vernacular, 
protocols, software, and hardware, and traditional IT generally serves people while OT 
serves devices.171 
Perhaps the biggest roadblock to securing federal facility BAS is the lack of 
control the DHS and GSA have over the contractors currently maintaining most BAS 
networks. As previously stated, as of March 2015, approximately 300 federal facility 
BAS networks are housed on the GSA network, and protected behind the GSA firewall; 
the remaining facilities are operated on private contractor networks. While GSA is in the 
process of moving these facilities over to their network, until they do, these networks 
appear to be beyond the control of the government.  
According to a 2014 GSA BAS upgrade contract solicitation, the government 
contractor ultimately awarded the contract was not required to disclose how many of their 
employees would have access to these networks or in what manner employees would 
access the network, whether or not risk assessments would be conducted, what, if any, 
intrusion detection software the company would use, or the effectiveness of the 
company’s password management policies.172  
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The guide for facilities standards for the Public Building Service (PBS) of GSA 
describes design standards and “criteria for new buildings, repairs and alterations.”173 
The guide describes GSA’s desire to integrate BAS designs with other IT systems to 
“minimize costs and improve operations.”174 This decision increases opportunities for 
network intrusions due to the additional IT systems exposed to the BAS. However, it is 
encouraging that the standards require the project manager to coordinate with the PBS 
chief information officer (CIO) at the beginning of the building design process, 
potentially limiting future cybersecurity vulnerabilities related to BAS installation and 
monitoring.175 
Another roadblock for the DHS is that it does not currently have sufficient 
technical expertise to assess these networks on a broad scale, nor investigate possible 
intrusions for eventual prosecution of bad actors, with the lone exception of the USSS.176 
ICS-CERT informed the author they have less than 30 personnel who are trained to 
respond to ICS network cybersecurity incidents and they lack law enforcement authority. 
Conversely, FPS has the necessary law enforcement authority and responsibility to 
protect federal facilities, yet lacks the technical expertise to perform cybersecurity 
duties.177 Currently, the only DHS component with both law enforcement authority to 
conduct criminal investigations and ICS forensic expertise is the USSS.178 However, the 
Secret Service is not currently conducting any investigative activity related to GSA-
owned facility BAS network intrusions. 
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At the 2015 Central Ohio InfoSec Summit, FBI Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) 
Kevin Rojek said, “The weakest link in cybersecurity is the general workforce”; this 
remains true of the DHS and GSA employees as well.179 As long as government 
employees operating on a government network continue clicking on malicious links and 
opening emails from unknown sources, government networks will remain vulnerable.180 
SSA Rojek, however, stated that, no matter how sophisticated your intrusion detection 
system is, a well-funded, committed adversary will compromise your network.181 SSA 
Rojek’s words foreshadowed the June 2015 discovery of arguably the greatest 
cyberattack perpetrated against the U.S. government.182 The cyberattack was directed 
toward the U.S. Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM), computer network.183 It is 
worth noting the OPM headquarters is an FPS-protected facility. If the attack had been 
perpetrated against the GSA to possibly obtain sensitive blueprints of intelligence 
community facilities, attackers could have potentially gained access to the BAS networks 
housed on the GSA enterprise network. 
B. CURRENT CYBERSECURITY LAW 
In the early 1980s, a lack of necessary criminal laws that could hold cyber 
criminals accountable for their actions existed.184 As a result, Congress created a new 
statute; 18, U.S.C Section 1030 (Fraud and Related Activity in Connection with 
Computers).185 The law has been strengthened over the years through additional 
legislative action, most notably through the passage of the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act (CFAA) of 1986.186 The provisions most applicable to a cyberattack perpetrated 
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against a BAS network are related to accessing a government computer without 
authorization or exceeding authorized use, obtaining information from a government 
computer in furtherance of any criminal or tortuous act, trespasses on a government 
network, damages to a computer or information or threats to do the same, and conspiracy 
to commit any of these offenses.187 This law would apply to any “bad actor,” whether 
trusted insider or “hacktivist,” who trespasses or actually enters the federal facility BAS 
network with or without actual damage being done to the network or connected systems. 
Whether or not a private contractor working on behalf of the government is 
considered a “department or agency of the United States for the purposes of prosecution” 
“has not been addressed by any court.”188 However, Section 1030(a) (3) allows for the 
prosecution of those who trespass into government and nongovernment systems, if “such 
conduct affects that use by or for the Government of the United States.”189 Those subject 
to prosecution under 1030(a) (3) are not required to have actually obtained information; 
merely “taking a look” would violate the law. It appears that this provision would cover 
intrusions into the networks belonging to private companies GSA has contracted to 
manage some BAS networks.  
The Cyber Security Enhancement Act (CEA) of 2002 increased penalties under 
CFAA for individuals whose “violation was intended to or had the effect of significantly 
interfering with or disrupting critical infrastructure; and whether the violation was 
intended to or had the effect of created a threat to public health or safety, or injury to any 
person.”190 Any attack on a federal facility BAS would inherently qualify for enhanced 
penalties under the CEA, potentially serving as a deterrent to trusted insiders and 
hacktivists. 
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C. RELEVANT DRAFT CYBERSECURITY LEGISLATION 
The 114th Congress is currently considering several cybersecurity-related bills 
and amendments that could impact federal facility BAS network security. If signed into 
law, these pieces of legislation would force the implementation of many of the policy 
options offered in this thesis, as well as encourage the private contractors who currently 
control the majority of federal facility BAS networks to provide the necessary risk 
mitigation strategies without fear of legal action. Aspects of the bills and amendments 
likely to affect the policy recommendations offered in this thesis are summarized in this 
section. 
H.R. 1731—National Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2015 (Introduced April 12, 2015) 
Requires DHS to deploy at no cost, capabilities to protect federal agency 
information and information systems, including technologies to 
continuously diagnose, detect, prevent, and mitigate cybersecurity risks 
involving such systems. Authorizes the DHS Secretary to access, and 
allows federal agency heads to disclose to the Secretary, information 
traveling to or from or stored on a federal agency information system, 
regardless of from where the Secretary accesses such information, 
notwithstanding any law that would otherwise restrict or prevent federal 
agency heads from disclosing such information to the Secretary.191 
The Act would also allow a private entity to assist the secretary in carrying out 
such activities and provide liability protections.192 
H.Amdt.100 to H.R.1731 (Introduced April 23, 2015) 
The Amendment ensures that federal agencies supporting cybersecurity 
efforts of private sector entities remain current on innovation; industry 
adoption of new technologies; and industry best practices as they relate to 
industrial control systems.193 
S.754—Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (Introduced March 17, 2015) 
“Permits private entities to monitor, and operate defensive measures to detect, 
prevent, or mitigate cybersecurity threats or security vulnerabilities on: (1) their own 
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information systems; and (2) with authorization and written consent, the information 
systems of other private or government entities.”194 Authorizes such “entities to monitor 
information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting such monitored systems.”195 The 
Act “allows entities to share and receive indicators and defensive measures with other 
entities or the federal government. Requires recipients to comply with lawful restrictions 
that sharing entities place on the sharing or use of shared indicators or defensive 
measures.”196 The Act would also allow a “private entity to assist the secretary in 
carrying out such activities” provide liability protections.197 
 H.R.1560: Protecting Cyber Networks Act (Introduced March 24, 2015) 
1. Permits private entities to monitor or operate defensive measures to 
prevent or mitigate cybersecurity threats or security vulnerabilities, or to 
identify the source of a threat, on: (1) their own information systems; and 
(2) with written authorization, the information systems of other private or 
government entities. Authorizes entities to conduct such activities on 
information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting such monitored 
systems 
2. Allows non-federal entities to share and receive indicators or defensive 
measures with other non-federal entities or specifically designated federal 
entities, but does not authorize non-federal entities to share directly with 
components of the Department of Defense (DOD), including the National 
Security Agency (NSA). Allows otherwise lawful sharing by non-federal 
entities of indicators or defensive measures with DOD or the NSA. 
Requires recipients to comply with lawful restrictions that sharing entities 
place on the sharing or use of shared indicators or defensive measures 
3. Requires the Small Business Administration (SBA) to provide assistance 
to small businesses and financial institutions to monitor information 
systems, operate defensive measures, and share and receive indicators and 
defensive measures. Directs the SBA to submit to the President a report 
regarding the degree to which small businesses and financial institutions 
are able to engage in such sharing. Requires the federal government to 
conduct outreach to encourage such businesses and institutions to engage 
in those activities. 
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4. Allows non-federal entities, for cybersecurity purposes, to share with other 
non-federal entities or the NCCIC any indicators or defensive measures 
obtained from: (1) their own information systems; or (2) the information 
systems of other federal or non-federal entities, with written consent. 
Authorizes non-federal entities (excluding state, local, or tribal 
governments) to conduct network awareness to scan, identify, acquire, 
monitor, log, or analyze information, or to operate defensive measures, on 
the information systems of entities that provide consent. 
5. Establishes a private cause of action that a person may bring against the 
federal government if a federal agency intentionally or willfully violates 
restrictions on the use and protection of voluntarily shared indicators or 
defensive measures.198 
 S.456: Cyber Threat Sharing Act of 2015 (Introduced February 11, 2015) 
1. Permits any entity to disclose lawfully obtained indicators to a federal 
entity for investigative purposes consistent with the lawful authorities of 
the federal entity. Restricts private entities’ use, retention, or further 
disclosure of cyber threat indicators to purposes relating to information 
system protection, cyber threat identification or mitigation or crime 
reporting. 
2. Prohibits a federal entity from using a disclosed indicator as evidence in a 
regulatory enforcement action against the entity that disclosed the 
indicator, but allows a federal entity to use disclosed indicators for 
regulatory enforcement if the information is received by other lawful 
means.199 
 H.R.234: Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act (Introduced January 8, 2015) 
1. Permits any entity to disclose lawfully obtained indicators to a federal 
entity for investigative purposes consistent with the lawful authorities of 
the federal entity. 
2. Restricts private entities’ use, retention, or further disclosure of cyber 
threat indicators to purposes relating to information system protection, 
cyber threat identification or mitigation, or crime reporting.200 
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 H.R.53—Cyber Security Education and Federal Workforce Enhancement Act 
 Introduced January 6, 2015) 
Amends the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to establish within the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) an Office of Cybersecurity 
Education and Awareness Branch to make recommendations to DHS 
regarding: (1) recruitment of information assurance, cybersecurity, and 
computer security professionals; (2) grants, training programs, and other 
support for kindergarten through grade 12, secondary, and post-secondary 
computer security education programs; (3) guest lecturer programs in 
which professional computer security experts lecture computer science 
students at institutions of higher education; (4) youth training programs for 
students to work in part-time or summer positions at federal agencies; and 
(5) programs to support underrepresented minorities in computer security 
fields with programs at minority-serving institutions.201 
D. THE ROLE OF GSA IN FEDERAL FACILITY BAS SECURITY 
The GSA’s business strategy is presumably linked to providing safe, secure, and 
cost-effective government facilities for federal agencies to carry out their work on behalf 
of the American people. The GSA business strategy should drive their organizational and 
information systems security strategy related to BAS, understanding that any strategy for 
one will have consequences for the others.202 Currently, due to the lack of BAS network 
security protocols, the GSA’s information systems security and organizational strategies 
do not support GSA’s business strategy as described previously.203 
In 2011, the GAO added federal real property management to its list of 30 areas it 
determined to be “high-risk due to their greater vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse, and 
mismanagement.”204 As of December 2014, BAS networks with network or Internet 
connections were installed in approximately 500 GSA-owned facilities, and the GSA has 
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only conducted limited security assessments of 300 of these facilities.205 The statistics 
regarding the number of facility BAS currently networked contained in the 2014 GAO 
report previously cited, differs from the numbers the GSA cited during a March 24, 2015 
briefing at the Cybersecurity Building Control Systems Workshop held in Washington, 
DC.206 One of the GSA representatives who presented at the Workshop was contacted to 
clarify the discrepancy but failed to respond to the author’s inquiry. 
The GSA recently communicated to the GAO that it is responsible for the 
networks that run BAS in their owned facilities; however, the GAO found that the GSA is 
not in compliance with FISMA.207 While the GSA is conducting “security control” 
assessments of federal facility BAS, the assessments are not designed to assess the 
cybersecurity risks BAS face.208 Additionally, the GSA only assessed the security 
controls of approximately 22 percent of their BAS-equipped facilities during a five-year 
period from 2009 to 2014.209 Further, of the 110 GSA-produced security assessments 
reviewed by the GAO, only about 18 percent were in compliance with the NIST 
framework.210 The GSA CIO explained that the GSA conducts their security assessments 
the way it does because the GSA’s “approach to assessing cyber risk to these systems is 
evolving.”211 
The GSA’s Building Technology Services’ representatives told the Cybersecurity 
Building Control Systems Workshop in March 2015 that only three hundred of its 
facilities that employ BAS network technology are housed on the GSA network, and 
protected behind the GSA firewall.212 The representatives revealed that the GSA is 
currently using 400 servers with 50 different pieces of software, and the devices and 
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software are not currently in compliance with federal security standards.213 To address 
BAS security issues, the GSA established a Building Technology Services Program 
Management Office (BTSPMO) within the CIO’s office, and created a security 
assessment process tailored to evaluate devices. The BTSPMO have assessed 150 unique 
devices and found that only 28 meet current GSA security standards.214 It is unknown if 
GSA security standards are in compliance with DHS security standards. 
Moving forward, the GSA has indicated the agency will begin utilizing DHS risk 
assessment software to assess vulnerabilities in its facilities that use networked BAS.215 
The GSA also plans to integrate the remaining buildings in its inventory, moving them 
from private-sector networks to the GSA network, protected behind the GSA firewall.216 
While it appears the GSA is moving in the right direction, their pace is slow. With no 
publicly acknowledged deadline for securing these networks, it is unknown how high a 
priority BAS network security is for the GSA. 
E. THE ROLE OF DHS IN FEDERAL FACILITY BAS SECURITY 
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 requires DHS to “protect federal facilities as 
well as people on the property.”217 However, a December 2014 GAO report found that 
“no one within DHS is assessing or addressing cyber risk to building and access control 
systems particularly at the nearly 9,000 federal facilities protected by FPS,” reportedly 
“because cyber threats involving these systems are an emerging issue.”218 DHS’s failure 
to assess the cyber risks to federal facilities appears to place them out of compliance with 
FISMA, as well as the National Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014 (NCPA), and the 
Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Act of 2014 (CWAA) . Although the time between 
the passage of those acts and the timing of this inquiry have been relatively short, DHS is 
also not in compliance with older E.O.s and presidential directives, namely E.O 13231, 
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PPD-21, or HSPD-23. These laws, directives, and E.O.s provide clear authorities, 
responsibilities, and mechanisms for DHS to secure federal facility BAS. Those 
authorities and responsibilities related to federal facility BAS networks are outlined in 
this section. 
FISMA (2002) 
• Required DHS to develop a plan to secure physical and technical assets 
that support U.S. critical infrastructure 
• Provided DHS with a comprehensive framework to assess risk through 
NIST 
• Required DHS secretary to create security controls to mitigate identified 
risks to information systems 
 
NCPA (2014) 
• Requires DHS to “develop, maintain, and exercise cyber incident response 
plans to address cybersecurity risks to critical Infrastructure.”219 
 
CWAA (2014) 
• Requires the DHS secretary to assess if the DHS workforce is capable of 
meeting its cybersecurity mission 
 
E.O. 13231 (2001) 
• Required the DHS secretary to coordinate cyber incident and response 




• Requires DHS to secure critical infrastructure that supports DHS’s 
primary mission 
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HSPD-23- (2008) 
• Requires DHS intrusion detection program, EINSTEIN, be deployed to all 
federal systems to enhance system security 
• Provides support for law enforcement capabilities 
 
The NPPD is responsible ensuring the United States remains both secure and 
resilient with respect to physical and cyber-critical infrastructure from attacks (physical 
and cyber) and catastrophic incidents.220 Security of federal facilities and federal 
information system networks are also the responsibility of NPPD.221  
Housed within NPPD’s National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration 
Center (NCCIC) is the Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team 
(ISC-CERT). The ISC-CERT provides on-site incident response to ICS-related incidents 
free of charge, conducts vulnerability, malware, and digital media analysis, offers 
mitigation strategies, provides situational awareness via actionable intelligence, 
coordinates “the responsible disclosure of vulnerabilities,” and provides alerts and 
bulletins on threats and vulnerabilities to ICS.222 However, these services are currently 
directed toward the private sector and federal facilities not protected by FPS. The ICS-
CERT also directed the development of the Cyber Security Evaluation Tool (CSET).223 
The CSET is a free, downloadable, step-by-step risk assessment tool that any ICS 
owner/operator can use to assess their ICS network cybersecurity practices “against 
recognized industry standards.”224 The tool highlights system vulnerabilities and 
identifies best practices to be followed.225 
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The Federal Protective Service (FPS), a subcomponent of NPPD, provides 
security and law enforcement services to over 9,000 facilities that are leased or owned by 
the government within the United Statesd .226 FPS carries out its mission by conducting 
facility security assessments to assess federal facility security vulnerabilities, as well as 
threat assessments and law enforcement response, and investigative follow-up. The FSA 
documents federal facility security vulnerabilities on a recurring basis (on either a three- 
or five-year interval based on the facility security level  of the facility being assessed).227 
FPS employs approximately 1,100 law enforcement and security professionals to 
accomplish their mission.228 FPS law enforcement officers derive their authority from 
Title 40 United States Code, section 1315, and are tasked with conducting felony 
criminal investigations involving crimes such as possession of explosives, sexual assault, 
robbery, homicide, arson, weapons violations, threats, and theft.229    
Although DHS does not currently have a strategy to secure federal facility BAS, 
NPPD has begun the process of understanding the cyber risks to federal facilities from 
facility BAS.230 In 2013, FPS, NPPD’s Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP), and ICS-
CERT conducted a joint security assessment of a GSA-owned facility in Washington, 
DC, assessing both the physical and cyber vulnerabilities.231 Also in 2013, FPS 
developed a discussion paper for the ISC that identified “the types of building systems 
that could be assessed for cyber risk, including heating, ventilation, and air conditioning; 
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access controls; closed-circuit video; fire annunciation panels; and security command and 
control centers.”232 
Despite the fact that PPD-21 clearly holds the GSA administrator responsible for 
the security of BAS networks inside GSA-owned facilities, DHS appears to be at least 
equally responsible. Both GSA and DHS are ISC working group members and, after the 
release of the 2014 GAO report on BAS network security, both now acknowledge their 
general responsibility to secure these networks. DHS agreed with the GAO 
recommendations and informed the GAO that NPPD’s FPS, IP, and CS&C have agreed 
to “consult with GSA, the Interagency Security Committee (ISC) and other relevant 
federal agencies to develop a strategy for addressing cyber risk to building and access 
control systems.”233  
ICS-CERT is also working with other ISC members to “incorporate potential 
cyber risks to buildings and access control systems into the Design-Basis Threat 
Report.”234 The GSA administrator agreed with the recommendations offered by the 
GAO and will ensure, going forward, that the GSA’s cyber risk assessments of its 
building control systems will be in compliance with FISMA.235 Additionally, the GSA 
agreed to partner with DHS to “develop and implement a framework” for cyber risks.236 
Although it is encouraging that DHS and the GSA have acknowledged this problem and 
both accept responsibility for fixing it, it remains to be seen exactly how that solution will 
look. 
F. EVALUATION CRITERIA 
Each option offered throughout this inquiry was analyzed using five evaluative 
categories obtained from Naval Postgraduate School alumnus Todd Consolini, of the 
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Center for Homeland Defense and Security.237 Consolini, a supervisory physical security 
specialist employed by the FPS, wrote his master’s thesis on innovative ways to enhance 
the physical security risk assessment process of federal facilities. Consolini’s criteria and 
framework were used in this thesis because the drivers he identified in his policy 
recommendations are applicable to current DHS policymakers’ sensitivities. These 
criteria are DHS acceptability, compliance (with laws, E.O.s, and presidential directives), 
implementation, effectiveness, and time.238 
DHS acceptability is the probable level of acceptance across all DHS sub-
components. An acceptability rating of low means the recommendation is not likely to be 
accepted by any DHS sub-component and a significant event will be necessary to gain 
acceptance.239 An acceptability rating of medium means the recommendation is likely to 
be accepted by the DHS sub-component leadership, but may not be by the practitioners 
charged with carrying out instructions from leadership.240 An acceptability rating of high 
means that the recommendation is expected to be accepted by both DHS sub-component 
leadership and practitioners.241 
Compliance is the level at which the recommendation complies with laws, E.O.s, 
and directives. Non-compliant means the recommendation does not, in any way, conform 
to established laws. Partial compliance implies the recommendation follows only some 
laws, while compliant means the recommendation fully meets the requirements of all 
laws, E.O.s, and directives related to securing federal facility BAS. 
Implementation refers to how difficult it may be to fully enact the 
recommendation across DHS. The analysis options are simple, somewhat difficult, or 
very difficult. A simple rating implies the recommendation will require virtually no 
additional personnel, training, or policy creation or revisions.242 A somewhat difficult 
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rating means that some additional personnel, training (less than six months), and few 
policy creations or revisions would be necessary. A very difficult designation means the 
recommendation will require large numbers of additional personnel, extensive training 
(more than six months), and major policy creations or revisions.243 
Effectiveness is the projected level of overall risk reduction associated with 
securing federal facility BAS.244 This criterion is evaluates the option as having low, 
medium, or high levels of risk reduction.245 A low level of risk reduction means the 
recommendation offers little to no improvement in federal facility BAS network 
security.246 A medium designation implies the recommendation will improve BAS 
network security at facilities housed on the GSA network, protected behind the GSA 
firewall. A high ranking indicates the recommendation will increase security of BAS 
networks in all GSA-owned facilities, because contractor-controlled BAS networks are 
factored into the recommendation. 
Time investment is the amount of time necessary for DHS to fully implement the 
recommendation. This is judged as requiring a minimal, minor, or major time 
commitment. A minimal time commitment means creation and employment are expected 
to take less than a year; minor means more than one year but less than two; major means 
more than two years.247  
G. ANALYSIS OF OPTION I: MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO 
Option I is presented in this inquiry as maintaining the status quo. This option 
exists to be matched against the other options/recommendations to ascertain the ideal 
option for the DHS. Table 1 summarizes the analysis of current DHS practices against the 
categories.  
                                                 






Table 1.   Status Quo (Option I) Evaluation 
Option DHS Acceptability Compliance Implementation Effectiveness Time 
I Low Not in Compliance Simple Low Minimal 
 
(1) DHS Acceptability 
DHS is currently not monitoring federal facility BAS networks or conducting risk 
assessments to determine the threats and vulnerabilities to these networks. However, 
DHS has agreed to develop a strategy to secure federal facility BAS that “defines the 
problem; identifies the roles and responsibilities; analyzes the resources needed, and 
identifies a methodology for assessing cyber risk to building and access control 
systems.”248 Therefore, the acceptability rating for Option I is low. 
(2) Compliance 
Because DHS does not currently conduct cybersecurity assessments of federal 
facility BAS, the Department is not in compliance with portions of at least three federal 
laws and at least three E.O.s and directives. As such, the DHS is assessed as not in 
compliance. 
(3) Implementation 
DHS is not currently involved in BAS network security for federal facilities; as 
there is nothing yet to actually implement, the implementation rating is simple. 
(4) Effectiveness 
DHS has failed to address cybersecurity concerns of federal facility BAS, and 
therefore has a low level of effectiveness in terms of reducing risks within BAS 
networks.249 
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(5) Time 
There is no publicly available information about DHS developing a strategy to 
secure BAS networks inside federal facilities. Time investment is assessed as minimal. 
H. OVERALL ANALYSIS 
Congress and the president have granted DHS clear authorities to protect federal 
facility BAS; however, the Department is still not monitoring or assessing the cyber risks 
to these facilities, and as such is not compliant with federal laws or presidential E.O.s and 
directives. Now that DHS has acknowledged its role in securing these networks, 
significant roadblocks remain—chiefly, that, after DHS develops a comprehensive 
strategy to secure these networks, the vast majority of them are currently controlled by 
private sector contractors. 
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IV. OPTION II—LEVERAGING EXISTING DHS CAPABILITIES 
A. OPTION II OVERVIEW 
DHS possesses a broad array of cyber security expertise and authorities that have 
evolved since the Department’s creation 12 years ago. DHS has developed its own 
intrusion detection software for federal information systems, created emergency response 
teams that can deploy to cybersecurity incidents on short notice, established a national 
integration center to share cyber-threat information, and joined the National Cyber 
Investigative Joint Taskforce (NCIJTF). However, DHS has not effectively incorporated 
its component and sub-component law enforcement authorities in its cyber mission. This 
chapter analyzes the existing capabilities the DHS possesses to determine if they are 
sufficient to secure federal facility BAS.  
Option II recommends leveraging existing DHS capabilities to defend against 
threat actors. DHS can employ ICS-CERT to conduct risk assessments and respond to 
cyber intrusions, and can deter future cyber threat actors by asking the USSS to conduct 
criminal investigations into intrusions (investigative findings can be forwarded to the 
Department of Justice for prosecution). DHS’s ICS-CERT should utilize their Cyber 
Security Assessment Tool (CSET) to conduct an initial assessment of federal facilities to 
determine if their BAS networks are in compliance with the NIST framework. DHS 
should also leverage ICS-CERT’s expeditionary capability to conduct risk assessments 
and incident response remotely, saving the significant cost associated with field 
deployments. 
Additionally, the DHS intrusion detection system (IDS), EINSTEIN, is 
presumably deployed on the GSA network; however, no references to the actual agencies 
utilizing EINSTEIN were located in the available research. While this thesis speculates 
EINSTEIN is protecting the 300 BAS currently on the GSA network, it is 
unconfirmed.250 The USSS has the technical expertise, equipment, and experience to 
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conduct intrusion investigations, gained through the work of their Critical Systems 
Protection Program (CSP). The CSP could leverage its many agents in field offices 
throughout the country to respond to reported intrusions on federal facility BAS 
networks. Option II would also integrate law enforcement response and investigative 
follow-up with current ICS-CERT responsibilities, largely consisting of assessing risk 
and preventing intrusions. 
B. NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY AND COMMUNICATIONS 
INTEGRATION CENTER 
To analyze both classified and unclassified vulnerabilities and threats, and 
coordinate findings with partner agencies to reduce risk to critical infrastructure, DHS 
established the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center 
(NCCIC).251 The NCCIC is “a 24x7 cyber situational awareness, incident response, and 
management center” housed within NPPD’s Office of Cybersecurity and 
Communications.252 Both the ICS-CERT and the United States Computer Emergency 
Readiness Team (US-CERT), as well as the National Coordinating Center for 
Communications are located within the NCCIC. The NCCIC is the “national nexus of 
cyber and communications integration for the federal government, intelligence 
community and law enforcement.”253 By leveraging the Center and its capabilities to 
secure federal facility BAS, the DHS would appear to have a significant cybersecurity 
“force-multiplier”; however, that may not be the case. 
In December 2014, President Obama signed into law the National Cybersecurity 
Protection Act (NCPA) of 2014. The Act amends the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to 
codify into law the existing NCCIC to “carry out responsibilities of the DHS Under 
Secretary responsible for overseeing critical infrastructure protection, cybersecurity, and 
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related DHS programs.”254 The Center shares real-time information on cybersecurity 
analysis, risks, incidents, and warnings for both the federal government and private sector 
across federal and non-federal platforms. However, due to the classified nature of the 
majority of the Center’s work, it is publicly unknown how effective the Center actually 
is.  
In August 2015, Nextgov, an “information resource for federal technology 
decision makers,” claimed that 75 percent of the NCCIC’s critical infrastructure sector 
analyst positions at the Center were vacant.255 Nextgov revealed that 11 critical 
infrastructure sectors did not deploy their analysts physically at the Center, leaving only 
four sectors represented. Nextgov speculated that these vacancies exist because private 
sector CI operators do not want to expend the resources to place employees outside of 
their organization. Further, it was revealed that DHS does not currently have the funds to 
sponsor private-sector participation.256 Also cited in the article was the private sector’s 
dissatisfaction with the time it takes to obtain security clearances and the cell phone 
security restrictions on employees assigned to the NCCIC, preventing them from 
communicating emerging cyber threats with their parent organizations in a timely 
manner.257 
Additionally, U.S. Senator Tom Coburn released a report in January 2015 titled, 
“A Review of the Department of Homeland Security’s Missions and Performance.”258 
Along with an inadequate level of participation, the report found that DHS is not 
leveraging all of the Center’s assets. The Coburn report also cited a 2013 DHS OIG 
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report claiming the NCCIC “struggled with sharing cyber information among the federal 
cyber operations centers.”259 
Industrial Control Systems-Cyber Emergency Response Team 
The ICS-CERT enjoys vast awareness of the cyber-risk landscape through their 
coordination with both private-sector and international computer emergency response 
teams (CERTs). Additionally, ICS-CERT’s Advanced Analytical Laboratory (AAL) 
provides research and analysis capabilities in support of ICS-CERT’s assessment and 
incident response activities.260 The AAL has developed a forensic suite called the 
Analyst Network Tool  that uses commercial and forensic tools; this suite has the 
capability to process multiple drive images, “reducing the amount of analyst hands-on 
time.”261 ICS-CERT has developed three training courses to help those responsible for 
ICS network security have more awareness of the risks associated with ICS. The first two 
training courses are available online and the third is a five-day, in-person, hands-on 
technical-level course.262 
In 2014, ICS-CERT responded both remotely and on-site to 245 cybersecurity 
incidents for control systems throughout the country to provide incident response support 
and mitigation strategies; approximately 13.5 percent of the incidents were linked to the 
Government Facilities Sector (GFS).263 However, from 2012 to 2014, ICS-CERT only 
provided on-site incident response on 17 occasions.264 This may be due to the limited 
number of personnel ICS-CERT employs, although, during the same period, they 
conducted 265 on-site risk assessments, with 104 in 2014 alone.265 The capabilities ICS-
CERT could bring to improve security of federal facility BAS are immense. ICS-CERT 
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can use their Cyber Security Evaluation Tool (CSET) to conduct initial assessments of 
BAS networks, and leverage the AAL, provide on-site and remote incident response if 
required, and provide risk assessments. 
C. NETWORK PROTECTIVE METHODS 
When deployed properly, IDS can “provide warnings indicating that a system is 
under attack, even if the system is not vulnerable to the specific attack.”266 Despite 
cybersecurity researchers’ best efforts, however, IDS technology is “immature and its 
effectiveness limited.”267 ICS network security programs are encouraged to follow, as the 
NIST SP 800–82 suggests, a “defense-in-depth” approach. A defense-in-depth approach 
protects a network with several mechanisms; if one fails, others will be in place to stop 
the attack.268 Once an IDS is deployed, provisions must also be made to monitor the 
system to ensure adequate response.269 IDS are designed to passively detect incoming or 
outgoing traffic linked to known malware signatures (Trojans, viruses, “worms, and other 
dangerous code”).270 Intrusion prevention systems (IPS) use IDS but enhance its 
detection capabilities with action that can be programmed to block intrusions based on 
specific signatures.271 As a result, IDS/IPS can only stop attacks of known bad 
signatures, making them useless against new or unique signatures. 
A typical ICS defense-in-depth strategy, as described in NIST SP-800-82, 
includes:  
• Developing security policies, procedures, training and educational 
material that applies specifically to the ICS 
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• Considering ICS security policies and procedures based on the Homeland 
Security Advisory System Threat Level, deploying increasingly 
heightened security postures as the Threat Level increases 
• Addressing security throughout the life cycle of the ICS from architecture 
design to procurement to installation to maintenance to decommissioning 
• Implementing a network topology for the ICS that has multiple layers, 
with the most critical communications occurring in the most secure and 
reliable layer. 
• Providing logical separation between the corporate and ICS networks 
(e.g., stateful inspection firewall(s) between the networks, unidirectional 
gateways) 
• Employing a DMZ network architecture (i.e., prevent direct traffic 
between the corporate and ICS networks) 
• Ensuring that critical components are redundant and are on redundant 
networks. 
• Designing critical systems for graceful degradation (fault tolerant) to prevent 
catastrophic cascading events 
• Disabling unused ports and services on ICS devices after testing to assure this 
will not impact ICS operation 
• Restricting physical access to the ICS network and devices 
• Restricting ICS user privileges to only those that are required to perform 
each person’s job (i.e., establishing role-based access control and 
configuring each role based on the principle of least privilege) 
• Using separate authentication mechanisms and credentials for users of the 
ICS network and the corporate network (i.e., ICS network accounts do not 
use corporate network user accounts) 
• Using modern technology, such as smart cards for Personal Identity 
Verification (PIV) 
• Implementing security controls such as intrusion detection software, 
antivirus software and file integrity checking software, where technically 
feasible, to prevent, deter, detect, and mitigate the introduction, exposure, 
and propagation of malicious software to, within, and from the ICS 
• Applying security techniques such as encryption and/or cryptographic 
hashes to ICS data storage and communications where determined 
appropriate 
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• Expeditiously deploying security patches after testing all patches under 
field conditions on a test system if possible, before installation on the ICS 
• Employing reliable and secure network protocols and services where 
feasible272 
1. National Cybersecurity Protection System 
The National Cybersecurity Protection System, known as EINSTEIN, was 
initially released in 2004 as a voluntary network surveillance program for government 
agencies.273 In 2007, under the direction of OMB, DHS developed the Trusted Internet 
Connection (TIC) Program to restructure U.S. government networks for the purpose of 
making them more secure.274 The GSA administers the TIC Program for the federal 
government.275 To date, only four companies (AT&T, Qwest, Sprint, and Verizon) have 
undergone the TIC compliance validation process.276 Prior to TIC, federal agencies could 
transact their own Internet services.277  
Subsequent upgrades to EINSTEIN II in 2008 included IDS capability, and in 
2014 DHS awarded a contract to CenturyLink to include IP capabilities in EINSTEIN III, 
due to be released in December 2015.278 EINSTEIN III will reportedly be capable of 
conducting advanced email filtering, spoofing protections, and mitigation and prevention 
services to participating federal agencies.279 Recently, the Assistant Secretary of the 
Office of Cybersecurity and Communications (CS&C), Andy Ozment, told a Senate 
committee that 51 federal agencies have signed memorandums of agreement (MOA) to 
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have EINSTEIN III installed on their networks.280 According to the MOA, CS&C 
provides signers of the MOA all labor, hardware, and software to deploy and operate 
EINSTEIN at no cost to the receiving agency.281 However, EINSTEIN is not cheap; 
DHS requested $479.8 million to deploy the system on federal networks for FY2016.282  
Additionally, the GAO has identified problems with the software’s performance 
and capabilities; EINSTEIN’s ability to detect signature anomalies is weak, and the new 
version of EINSTEIN uses only one of three NIST-identified detection methodologies.283 
The GAO also discovered that EINSTEIN is “only able to proactively mitigate threats 
across a limited subset of network (i.e., Domain Name System traffic and email).”284 
EINSTEIN deployment was another area the GAO found needed improvement. The 
GAO identified individual agency “implementation and policy challenges” for the limited 
number of federal agencies currently using EINSTEIN.285 
As previously stated, IDS effectiveness is limited. While details are still emerging 
regarding the hacking method used in the devastating 2015 hack of OPM government 
employee files, DHS Spokesman S.Y. Lee said EINSTEIN was involved in discovering 
the breach.286 DHS Cybersecurity Consultant Morgan Wright contends, however, that 
EINSTEIN failed to work properly because it took five months to discover the 
intrusion.287 It should be noted that OPM did not have the current version of EINSTEIN 
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(EINSTEIN III) installed on its network at the time of the attack.288 Previous versions of 
EINSTEIN were only capable of “identifying abnormal network traffic and detection 
known malicious traffic.”289 DHS Assistant Secretary for the Office of Cybersecurity and 
Communications Andy Ozment recently told Congress that the current version of 
EINSTEIN, EINSTEIN IIIA, is “like a guard post, capable of blocking prohibited users 
from accessing a network.”290 If OPM had been using the latest version of EINSTEIN, it 
appears the hack may never have happened. 
2. Cyber Security Evaluation Tool (CSET) 
CSET was developed under the direction of ICS-CERT to provide ICS owners 
and operators with a repeatable and systematic method for conducting assessments 
against several accepted standards and security practices, such as the NIST cybersecurity 
framework for ICS (SP-800-82).291 CSET is a free-of-charge desktop software tool that 
can be used by “any organization to assess the security posture of cyber systems that 
manage a physical process or enterprise network,” like a federal facility BAS.292 The tool 
employs a user-friendly, question-and-answer format, much like the FPS Modified 
Infrastructure Survey Tool, which FPS uses to assess the physical security vulnerabilities 
of federal facilities. ICS-CERT has also made online tutorial videos that demonstrate how 
to use the tool, and will conduct on-site training to approved persons.293   
Although CSET provides an initial starting point to establish a baseline security 
posture of a BAS, it does have limitations.294 For example, CSET does not allow for 
detailed review of software and hardware configurations or detailed network architectural 
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analysis.295 It must be noted, also, that CSET is a cybersecurity evaluation tool and, as 
such, does not evaluate risk.296 With cyber threats facing ICS evolving almost daily, 
CSET is not enough to protect federal facility BAS, but is a starting point to begin the 
process. Earlier this year, the GSA expressed interest in utilizing CSET as part of their 
future assessments of federal facility BAS.297 
D. UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE CRITICAL SYSTEMS 
PROTECTION PROGRAM 
Previously under the Department of Treasury, the USSS moved to the new 
Department of Homeland Security as a result of the Homeland Security Act of 2002.298 
Since the USSS moved to DHS they have expanded their involvement in cybersecurity 
significantly. Since 2003, the USSS Electronic Crimes Task Forces, consisting of federal, 
state, and local law enforcement agencies, expanded to twelve cities.299 The USSS also 
established the Critical Systems Protection Initiative (CSPI), which leverages USSS 
cyber investigative trained personnel to support the Agency’s mission at protected 
venues.300 The CSPI was successfully used to secure the 2002 Salt Lake Olympics.301 
The Secret Service derives their authority to investigate cybercrime from Title 18 Section 
1030 of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986.302 In 2008, the USSS established 
the National Computer Forensics Institute, where they train state and local law 
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enforcement, free of charge, on such topics as cybercrime trends and investigative 
methods.303 
In 2004, the USSS partnered with the Carnegie Mellon University to conduct a 
study on the insider threat of “illicit cyber activity in the Banking and Finance Sector.”304 
The study revealed that “behavioral approaches and security techniques could be 
effective in lessening an entity’s exposure to threats from the cyber world.” The study 
further found that, “1.) Most intrusions required little to no sophistication; 2.) Most 
intrusions were financially motivated; and 3.) Incidents were often uncovered by different 
entities but were rarely discovered by the victim.”305 
In 2010, the USSS established the Critical Systems Protection (CSP) program to 
support their protective mission. From 2010 to 2014, the USSS CSP program 
successfully completed more than 657 domestic and five international protective 
advances of venues the president, vice president, and other USSS protectees visited.306 
The CSP program’s technology “gives the Secret Service the ability to identify cyber-
threat actors, as well as mitigate the potential impact of a network attack on a protective 
venue or on the critical infrastructure that supports the venue.”307  
The Secret Service, as the lone DHS entity with law enforcement authority to 
investigate cyber intrusions, has access to a wealth of information and resources and is in 
a unique position to assist or lead criminal investigations into network intrusions. The 
National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force (NCIJTF) is an FBI-led task force created 
in January 2008 by HSPD-23, and is responsible for “coordinating, integrating, and 
sharing pertinent information related to cyber threat investigations.”308 
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E. ANALYSIS AGAINST EVALUATION CRITERIA 
As stated in Chapter III, each option is analyzed using five categories. These 
categories are DHS acceptability, compliance, implementation, effectiveness, and 
time.309 Table 2 summarizes the analysis of Option II against these categories.310 
Table 2.   Option II Evaluation 
Option DHS Acceptability Compliance Implementation Effectiveness Time 
II Medium Partially Compliant 
Somewhat 
Difficult Medium Minor 
 
(1) DHS Acceptability 
The acceptability rating for Option II is averaged at medium. There are two 
entities charged with carrying out Option II; ICC-CERT received a rating of low and the 
USSS received a rating of high. While DHS headquarters leadership may be accepting of 
Option II, NPPD leadership may feel slighted; by allowing the Secret Service to conduct 
incident response and investigative follow-up, Option II completely removes the Federal 
Protective Service—a sub-component of NPPD with law enforcement investigative 
authority—from the strategy.  
ICS-CERT employees would most likely welcome the use of CSET in federal 
facility assessments; however, Option II is not expected to be accepted by the employees 
of ICS-CERT.311 By incorporating a law enforcement element to what has traditionally 
been a mitigation and assessment operation, ICS-CERT runs the risk of alienating their 
largest customer: the private sector. They have built a relationship of trust and discretion, 
and it is likely that private sector ICS critical infrastructure owners and operators would 
hesitate to report an intrusion to ICS-CERT if they feared the report could one day find 
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its way into a courtroom. Despite the fact that law enforcement would only investigate 
intrusions into federal networks, the perception could persist.  
Although the acceptability rating for ICS-CERT is judged as low, due to the 
recent increase of USSS involvement with cyber-related activities and investigations, 
Secret Service acceptability rating is judged as high because of the additional resources 
and expanded authority their involvement would likely foster. Both managers and 
employees would likely see this as an opportunity to improve their public image as well 
as to fine-tune skills used to protect private sector critical infrastructure sites under their 
umbrella. The expenses incurred by the Secret Service would likely be minimal due to 
the large number of available cyber-trained agents deployed throughout the country. The 
pre-existing framework the Secret Service utilizes for private sector critical infrastructure 
ICS assessments would also likely save funds. Finally, since the USSS was transferred to 
DHS, the agency has had some difficulty integrating within DHS; Option II encourages 
their integration.312 
(2) Compliance with Laws, Presidential Executive Orders, and Directives 
Option II is partially compliant with FISMA because it provides a plan to secure 
the physical and technical assets that support U.S. critical infrastructure.313 It is 
compliant with the NCPA because it provides for a cyber-incident response plan. Option 
II may be partially compliant with HSPD-23 because EINSTEIN may be protecting 
federal facility BAS deployed on the GSA network, but not those housed on contractor-
owned networks. Option II is compliant with PPD-21 because it provides cyber incident 
response coordinated through ICS-CERT and USSS. The USSS is assessed to be 
compliant with Title 18 Section 1030, which authorizes the agency to conduct criminal 
investigations into cyber intrusions of federal facility BAS networks. 
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(3) Implementation 
Implementation of Option II is assessed as somewhat difficult.314 First, a 
memorandum of agreement would need to be signed between NPPD and USSS outlining 
roles and responsibilities for each. Both ICS-CERT and USSS would be required to write 
policies covering this new mission area; however, by leveraging existing related policies, 
this would not be a major undertaking. No significant training should be required for 
existing personnel. However, expanding ICS-CERT’s role to include initial and continual 
network security assessment would require a moderate human capital investment to 
ensure existing capabilities are not degraded. In these times of federal budget austerity, it 
is unknown if NPPD would be able to support an expansion of its workforce for a threat 
that has not yet knowingly occurred in a federal facility. 
(4) Effectiveness 
Option II has a medium level of effectiveness in terms of risk reduction.315 By 
incorporating a strategy that involves reoccurring risk assessment and incident response, 
as well as investigative follow-up of federal facility network intrusions, DHS is fulfilling 
its obligation to protect the cyber networks of critical infrastructure. However, this 
strategy would only affect roughly a quarter of the facilities owned by the GSA, and none 
of the commercial facilities the GSA leases from the Commercial Facilities Sector (CFS). 
(5) Time 
Option II is assessed as requiring a minor time investment.316 The development of 
policies by ICS-CERT and USSS, as well as MOAs signed by both, are expected to take 
less than a year. However, the recruitment and training associated with new personnel for 
this new ICS-CERT mission is expected to take more than a year, but less than two. 
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F. OVERALL ASSESSMENT 
Option II would provide DHS with a relatively quick alternative to the status quo, 
and is assessed to be generally accepted by the DHS headquarters leadership and fully 
implementable in less than two years. While Option II cannot secure all federal facility 
BAS, it is a starting point. However, Option II does not take into account the mass 
exodus of USSS personnel every four years from their field offices to support presidential 
campaign protection. How DHS could overcome the gap in cyber incident response due 
to the void of deployed USSS personnel has not been assessed. 
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V. OPTION III: CREATING A CYBERSECURITY DIVISION 
INSIDE THE FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE 
A. OVERVIEW OF OPTION III 
The Federal Protective Service (FPS) deploys a small, yet diverse and 
geographically dispersed, workforce focused on providing law enforcement and security 
services to protect federal facilities.317 FPS is responsible for conducting physical risk 
assessments of federal facilities as well as criminal investigations into crimes occurring 
on federal property.318 Backed by law and presidential E.O.s and directives, as well as 
provisions in the NIPP, FPS has clear authority to adopt the mission of securing federal 
facility BAS networks. Currently, however, FPS lacks the expertise to carry out this 
responsibility.319 
Option III recommends that FPS leverage its existing risk management strategies 
(including those through ICS-CERT) and FPS’ general criminal investigative techniques. 
Supplemented with new cybersecurity training, FPS could establish a cybersecurity 
capability to secure federal facility BAS networks. The roles and responsibilities 
associated with this new division are quite similar to existing FPS roles and 
responsibilities—namely, facility security assessments, continuous risk and threat 
assessment of federal facilities, and investigative response to crimes occurring on federal 
facilities. Significant challenges, however, such as recruitment and training for this 
undertaking, require a long-term commitment. 
B. HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE  
The FPS traces its lineage back to the 1700s, when President George Washington 
appointed “three commissioners to establish a federal territory for a permanent seat of the 
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Federal Government”; an additional six night watchmen were ordered to protect the 
buildings the government would occupy.320 Moving forward, the Act of June 1, 1948 
created the General Services Administration (GSA) and, in the process, authorized the 
GSA to appoint special policemen to monitor all “buildings and areas owned or occupied 
by the United States and under charge and control of GSA.”321 These special policemen 
performed duties such as rendering first aid, answering visitor questions, and working 
fixed posts.322 Over time, these duties would be transferred to FPS-managed contract 
security guards, now known as protective security officers (PSOs), of whom there are 
approximately 15,000.323 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, several federal facilities were attacked and 
damaged by bombings, disrupting functions of government.324 These incidents likely 
contributed to the GSA administrator’s decision to, in 1971, formally create the FPS 
through Administrative Order 5440.46.325 From the 1970s to the 1990s, FPS generally 
served as a proactive police force for federal facilities. After the April 19, 1995 truck 
bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, which killed 168 
men, women, and children, federal facility security was under scrutiny.326   
As described in Chapter I, President Clinton ordered a complete review of federal 
facility physical security in the aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing, which required 
all federal executive branch agencies to upgrade security at their facilities to ensure 
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compliance with newly established minimal standards.327 Although federal facilities 
likely employed BAS at the time of the bombing, these systems were not connected to the 
Internet until several years later. As such, no technical security measures were assessed. 
The GSA was “also required to establish building security committees for all its 
facilities,” which were later renamed facility security committees.328 These committees 
meet on an as-needed basis to discuss security-related matters, such as whether or not 
existing countermeasures are sufficient. On October 19, 1995, the Interagency Security 
Committee (ISC) was established through Executive Order 12977.329 The ISC was 
chaired by the GSA administrator until 2003, when the chairmanship transferred to the 
secretary of DHS.330 
C. FPS AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION 
In 2002, the Homeland Security Act transferred FPS to the newly created 
Department of Homeland Security, where it was designated as part of Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement.331 The Act also transferred the responsibility for federal facility 
security from the GSA to DHS.332 The Act required the secretary of DHS to “protect the 
buildings, grounds, and property that are owned, occupied, or secured by the Federal 
Government.”333 FPS derives its law enforcement authority from Title 40 U.S.C, Section 
1315.334 FPS law enforcement officers are authorized to 
 (A) enforce federal laws and regulations for the protection of persons and 
property; 
 (B) carry firearms; 
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• (C) make arrests without a warrant for any offense against the United 
States committed in the presence of the officer or agent or for any felony 
cognizable under the laws of the United States if the officer or agent has 
reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed 
or is committing a felony; 
• (D) serve warrants and subpoenas issued under the authority of the United 
States; 
• (E) conduct investigations, on and off property in question, of offenses 
that may have been committed against property owned or occupied by the 
Federal Government or persons on the property; and  
• (F) carry out such other activities for the promotion of homeland security 
as the Secretary may prescribe.335 
In 2009, Congress passed a law transferring FPS yet again, this time to the 
National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD).336 It was believed that this move 
would enhance NPPD’s role in protecting infrastructure, and that it would be a natural fit 
for FPS due to their role in the GFS.337 However, this decision moved FPS out of a DHS 
operational law enforcement component and into a component with no law enforcement 
authority.338 
D. FPS ORGANIZATION 
Currently, FPS provides security and law enforcement services to over 9,000 
facilities that are leased or owned by the government in the United States.339 While FPS 
is a small agency in terms of numbers (with about 1,100 employees), their footprint is 
large with many mission areas.340 As such, only areas that expect to play a role in 
establishing FPS’ capacity to secure federal facility BAS networks are included in this 
organizational review.  
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FPS is geographically organized into three zones, each lead by a member of the 
Senior Executive Service. These three zones are responsible for 11 geographic regions, 
which are further decentralized by districts and areas, and supported by a national 
headquarters.341 Within each region are three branches: a threat mitigation branch, which 
is responsible for criminal investigations, intelligence, federal facility covert security 
testing, and contract suitability investigations; a risk management branch, responsible for 
managing the regional contract guard program and the technical countermeasures 
program; and a mission support branch, responsible for providing administrative and 
logistical support services. FPS districts and areas are established based on locations of 
FPS protected facilities; they provide law enforcement and security services, conduct 
facility security assessments, and oversee FPS contract protective security officers 
(PSOs).342 
1. Mission Support 
FPS mission support operations are supported by 12 mission support functions, 
which are aligned with NPPD’s lines of business functions.343 The FPS mission support 
functions are: 
1. Human Capital 
2. Budget, Finance, Revenue, and Performance Management 
3. Acquisition Management 
4. Procurement 
5. Information Technology 
6. Logistics, Facilities, Fleet, and Property Accountability and Management 
7. Policy and Contingency Planning 
8. Public Affairs 
9. Personnel Security 
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10. Office of General Counsel 
11. Labor Relations 
12. Executive Secretariat344 
There are many challenges in creating a cybersecurity capability within FPS 
including recruitment and training. During a March 2013 hearing before the House of 
Representatives, then-FBI Director Mueller stated that the cyber threat would surpass the 
terrorism threat to America in the coming years, perhaps due in large part to a lack of 
cybersecurity specialists with the knowledge, skills, and abilities needed to confront 
potential adversaries.345 The lack of cybersecurity specialists is most severe in the federal 
government; the shortage undermines the nation’s cybersecurity and remains a challenge 
for any future FPS cybersecurity initiative.346 
2. EPS Funding Structure 
FPS is unique in its funding structure, as it not funded by yearly congressional 
appropriations.347 All FPS expenses must be funded by revenue received from two 
sources: a “basic security fee” paid by federal facility tenants and reimbursable and 
building-specific revenues that amount to 74 cents per square foot for all FPS-protected 
GSA-controlled space.348 In essence, “All of FPS’s security fees are available to FPS, 
without fiscal year limitation, for necessary expenses related to the protection of federally 
owned and leased buildings for FPS operations.”349 The square footage in the GSA 
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inventory varies due to changes in facility occupancy; however, the average revenue 
collected in 2012 was approximately $270.1 million.350 Generally, before FPS can take 
part in an activity, FPS must ensure the activity aligns with this funding allocation by 
contributing to protecting federal government property; this ensures that “1) There is a 
permissible funding source; 2) There is separate reimbursement for duties that otherwise 
fall within FPS law enforcement authority but are not funded; or 3) There is some other 
legal authority to conduct the activity in the absence of reimbursement.”351 
3. Training and Professional Development 
FPS training and professional development (TPD) is led by a member of the SES, 
and assists the FPS in accomplishing its mission to protect federal facilities and those 
who occupy them. FPS TPD is aligned with FPS strategic goals, including “sustainment 
of a valued, highly skilled, and agile law enforcement, security, and mission support 
workforce.”352FPS TPD has established 11 core training functions that allow it to 
“assess, mitigate, and respond to current and emerging threats to federal facilities.”353 
The 11 core training functions are: 
1. Entry-Level Training 
2. Special Skills Training 
3. In-Service Certifications 
4. Career and Professional Development 
5. Field Training Program Management 
6. Advanced, Technical and Refresher Training 
7. Mission Support Training 
8. PSO Training 
9. FPS Officer Safety Training 
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10. Training Exercises 
11. FPS Lessons Learned354 
TPD does have the infrastructure in place to support cyber risk assessment 
training for FPS employees, and for subsequent criminal investigations into intrusions. 
Almost every aspect of this endeavor, however, would need to be conducted by 
organizations outside of FPS, as FPS does not have expertise in either subject area. 
However, ICS-CERT, also housed in NPPD, is uniquely situated to provide some training 
to FPS on BAS network security assessment methods, as well as training on the NPPD-
developed assessment tool, CSET. Additionally, FPS could utilize the National 
Cybersecurity Workforce Framework issued by the DHS National Initiative for 
Cybersecurity Education (NICE).355 The framework categorizes various cybersecurity-
related functions, from vulnerability assessment and management to criminal 
investigations and software acquisition, and offers necessary knowledge, skills, and 
abilities associated with each task.356  
NICE, administered by US-CERT, also has a training portal on its website where 
federal employees or nonfederal civilians can search for cybersecurity-related training 
classes.357 Several of the training programs located on the NICE portal include entry-
level training programs available at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center  and 
the Defense Cyber Investigative Training Academy; these programs  could equip FPS 
with a strong foundation in computer and network forensics.358 Once entry-level courses 
are completed, FPS employees would be prepared for more advanced training in network 
and control system forensics from such notable institutions as SANS and the Carnegie 
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Mellon Institute, touted by DOD cybersecurity experts.359 Successful completion of 
advanced training courses is necessary to conduct forensically sound investigations into 
such technically demanding areas as BAS facility network intrusions.360 
E. ANALYSIS AGAINST EVALUATION CRITERIA 
As mentioned in Chapter III, each option is analyzed using five evaluation 
criteria.361 Table 3 summarizes the assessment of Option III against these criteria.362 
Table 3.   Option III Evaluation 
Option DHS Acceptability Compliance Implementation Effectiveness Time 
III Medium Partially Compliant 
Very 
Difficult Medium Major 
 
 
(1) DHS Acceptability 
The acceptability rating for Option III is assessed as medium due to the time it 
would take FPS to establish a viable cybersecurity program.363 Although FPS leadership 
is expected to embrace at least part of Option III—namely, the inclusion of a cyber-
component to the existing FPS FSA process—they may be less enthusiastic about the 
expense and time associated with hiring new personnel and training new or existing 
personnel for this new mission. 
However, Option III offers the potential for several benefits for FPS. If FPS 
becomes proficient in BAS network intrusion investigations, it is possible FPS could 
expand their cyber role to assist tenant agencies with network intrusion investigations. 
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This new mission could possibly be funded with a direct appropriation or reimbursed 
directly from the agency FPS is assisting. Knowing FPS is actively engaged in 
successfully combating emerging threats could have a long-lasting, positive impact on the 
FPS-federal facility tenant relationship. Option III would also create a professional 
development opportunity for special agents currently hampered by nonexistent career 
tracks. 
(2) Compliance with Laws, Presidential Executive Orders, and Directives 
Option III is partially compliant with FISMA because it provides a plan to secure 
the physical and technical assets that support U.S. critical infrastructure.364 It is 
compliant with the NCPA because it provides for a cyber-incident response plan. Option 
III has the potential to be partially compliant with HSPD-23 because EINSTEIN may be 
protecting federal facility BAS deployed on the GSA network (not, however, those 
housed on contractor-owned networks). Further, the option is compliant with PPD-21 
because it provides cyber incident response coordinated through ICS-CERT, and 
compliant with Title 18 Section 1030, which authorizes FPS to conduct criminal 
investigations into cyber intrusions of federal facility BAS networks. 
(3) Implementation 
Implementation of Option III is assessed as very difficult; the option would 
require creating new position descriptions, hiring additional personnel, obtaining 
extensive training, and creating new policies.365 Although many federal agencies have 
developed internal cybersecurity educational programs and partnerships with colleges 
and universities to increase the size and capabilities of their cybersecurity cadres, these 
programs have been created to cultivate employees’ skills over several (5 to 10) years, 
leaving the United States vulnerable in the interim.366 It is unlikely FPS could benefit 
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from programs with such lengthy developmental timeframes due to the current 
vulnerabilities and threats federal facility BAS networks face. 
According to a 2013 study conducted by the International Internet System 
Security Certification Consortium, 61 percent of U.S. federal agencies surveyed stated 
that cyber security positions are going unfilled, despite the motivation and budget to fill 
them.367 The positions in most demand are for the top one percent of the best hackers 
available.368 A November 2010 report (prepared by the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies for the President of the United States) revealed there were 
approximately 1,000 cybersecurity practitioners in the United States who had the skills 
needed to combat the cyber threat; however, the nation needs between 10,000 and 30,000 
cyber warriors.369 If FPS does create a cybersecurity program, the agency would likely 
be competing for the same talent with such national security-focused agencies as the CIA, 
FBI, and NSA. While the federal salaries these national security agencies could offer new 
hires would probably be comparable to FPS, it is unlikely the FPS mission of securing 
federal facility BAS would compare to the appeal of national security agencies’ missions. 
(4) Effectiveness 
Option III is assessed as having a medium level of effectiveness in terms of risk 
reduction.370 By incorporating a strategy that involves reoccurring risk assessment and 
incident response, as well as investigative follow-up of federal facility network 
intrusions, DHS is fulfilling its obligation to protect the cyber networks of its critical 
infrastructure. However, this strategy would only affect roughly a quarter of the facilities 
owned by the GSA, and none of the commercial facilities the GSA leases from the CFS. 
Additionally, because of the time and expense associated with Option III, FPS must take 
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into consideration retention challenges it may face; the expensive training they provide 
will equip employees with highly marketable skills, making them attractive to private 
sector employers. 
(5) Time 
Option III is assessed as having a major time investment due to security clearance 
and training requirements that would need to be met.371 The recruitment of additional 
personnel is expected to take over a year but less than two. Training associated with this 
new mission is expected to take less than a year for experienced cybersecurity 
professionals, but more than two for existing FPS personnel with no cybersecurity 
experience. 
F. OVERALL ASSESSMENT 
Option III would provide DHS with an alternative long-term solution to the status 
quo to mitigate a significant vulnerability to federal facilitates. As the lead sector specific 
agency for the GFS, FPS has the statutory authority to develop a cybersecurity program; 
as such, Option III is assessed to be generally accepted by the DHS headquarters 
leadership and could be fully implemented in less than three years. While Option III 
cannot secure all federal facility BAS networks at this time, it provides a clear strategy to 
secure those currently under government control. 
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VI. OPTION IV: HYBRID APPROACH 
Option IV consists of two sub-options; IV(A) and IV(B). Both options suggest 
utilizing cybersecurity contractors and the Secret Service; Option IV(A), however, only 
utilizes these resources until the FPS can establish a viable cybersecurity program of its 
own. Option IV(B) removes the FPS from the eventual operational role analyzed in 
Option IV(A). 
A. OPTION IV(A): TEMPORARILY UTILIZING CYBERSECURITY 
CONTRACTORS AND THE SECRET SERVICE 
Option IV(A) recommends FPS leverage its existing knowledge of federal 
contracts (gained through managing several contract security guard programs over many 
years) to immediately deploy cybersecurity contractors to begin protecting federal facility 
BAS. These contractors would remain until FPS could fully establish their cybersecurity 
program, mentioned in Chapter V. This option would immediately reduce the current 
identified federal facility BAS network vulnerabilities, but a lack of cybersecurity 
contracting expertise could create additional problems for FPS. 
Additionally, Option IV(A) recommends that FPS leverage the Secret Service’s 
incident response and cyber intrusion investigative experience, highlighted in Chapter IV, 
until the FPS cybersecurity program is fully operational. This recommendation provides 
an immediate solution to current BAS network vulnerabilities. Option IV(A) also 
provides FPS with a knowledge base for intrusion response and investigatory 
responsibilities as they are transferred from the USSS to FPS. 
1. The Benefits of a Contractor-Based Approach 
Due to the challenges FPS faces with establishing a credible cybersecurity 
program—specifically, the bureaucracy associated with hiring federal employees and the 
length of time needed to train its existing workforce—hiring contractors to perform BAS 
network assessments and provide incident response could be the answer. Burning Glass, a 
workforce technology firm, concluded in 2013 that it can take 36 percent longer to fill 
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cybersecurity vacancies than all other job postings.372 Once FPS has established their 
cybersecurity program, they would take over all responsibilities previously held by the 
contractors they were overseeing. Additionally, these contractors could serve as 
experienced mentors to FPS federal personnel during the transition to an all-federal force.  
As mentioned in Chapter V, the government faces an incredible challenge to hire 
cybersecurity professionals, despite having the motivation and budgets to do so. Lower 
pay, complex hiring rules, lack of independence, and intrusive background investigations 
have all been cited as reasons the government is having a hard time recruiting 
cybersecurity professionals.373 For more than two decades, the federal government has 
overcome the difficulty associated with hiring extremely skilled workers by outsourcing 
their work to private contractors.374 Contractors, however, can offer market prices to 
skilled workers who can provide qualified personnel not available within the 
government.375 According to Booz Allen Hamilton, private contractors make up the 
majority of DHS cybersecurity workers.376 In fact, a DHS Office of Inspector General 
report from 2008 found that 83 percent of the DHS Chief Information Officer’s personnel 
were contractors.377  
Another added benefit FPS would obtain from initially using cybersecurity 
contractors instead of government employees is the immediacy of the resource. 
Cybersecurity contractors typically already possess the skills and security clearances 
required to secure networks.378 Perhaps the most convincing argument, however, is that 
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DHS is already using them. A 2012 Homeland Security Advisory Council report 
submitted by the Cyber Skills Task Force stated that DHS has used cybersecurity 
contractors to fill such jobs as security engineers, reverse engineers, and penetration 
testers.379 The taskforce determined, “Contractors with the right skill mix will enable 
DHS to upgrade its capabilities quickly.”380 The report concluded that these same 
contractors may decide to later join DHS as federal employees once they “get a taste” for 
the DHS mission.381 
2. Limitations of a Contractor-Based Approach 
Employing private contractors is not without its challenges. For example, the 
contracts must be managed by federal employees, who must “establish requirements, 
evaluate proposals, and select contractors.”382 If the federal employee charged with 
oversight does not have technical knowledge to adequately administer the contract, the 
government could overspend for the service.383 This knowledge gap could also cause the 
government to purchase unnecessary or incorrect services from the contractor.384 
3. Leveraging the Secret Service 
As stated in Chapter IV, the USSS already possesses the manpower, training, 
equipment, expertise, and authority to conduct criminal investigations into BAS 
intrusions. By leveraging USSS capabilities, FPS can take the necessary time to establish 
their own program. Once the FPS program is established, the USSS would be available 
for consultation as subject-matter experts. DHS components and subcomponent agencies 
already rely on one another to supplement their existing services in times of crisis. Most 
notably is the Secret Service’s use of outside federal agents to supplement its existing 
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security workforce during presidential campaigns.385 Another example is the Federal Air 
Marshal Service, which, during times of increased threats, have relied on other federal 
agents within DHS to supplement its force.386 
4. Analysis against Evaluation Criteria 
Table 4 outlines the assessment of Option IV(A) against the evaluation categories. 
Table 4.   Option IV(A) Evaluation 
Option DHS Acceptability Compliance Implementation Effectiveness Time 
IV(A) High Partially Compliant Simple Medium Minimal 
 
(1) DHS Acceptability 
The acceptability rating for Option IV(A) is judged as high because DHS is 
already successfully using cybersecurity contractors on a grand scale.387 After working as 
a contractor, it is believed that the contractor would have a better understanding of DHS’ 
mission and would therefore be more likely to join DHS as a federal employee.388 
Finally, the FPS would most likely endorse this option because it allows them to fulfill 
their core mission of protecting federal facilities and employees almost immediately, 
while at the same time providing them time to eventually take over the cybersecurity 
mission completely. 
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(2) Compliance with Existing Laws, Presidential Executive Orders, and 
Directives 
Option IV(A) is compliant with FISMA because it provides a plan to secure the 
physical and technical assets that support U.S. critical infrastructure. It is compliant with 
the NCPA because it provides for a cyber-incident response plan. Option IV(A) may be 
partially compliant with HSPD-23 because EINSTEIN may be protecting federal facility 
BAS deployed on the GSA network, not those housed on contractor-owned networks. 
Option IV(A) is compliant with PPD-21 because it provides cyber incident response 
coordinated through DHS-contracted cybersecurity professional and the USSS. Further, 
the option is compliant with Title 18 Section 1030, which authorizes the USSS to conduct 
criminal investigations into cyber intrusions of federal facility BAS networks. 
(3) Implementation 
Implementation of Option IV (A) is judged as simple due to the immediacy 
contractors and Secret Service Agents could begin working.389 Although FPS would need 
to quickly educate its contracting officers on cybersecurity contracting issues to reduce 
errors or minimize errors, they could leverage existing knowledge in this area possessed 
by others in the DHS such as the CIO. While policies would need to be created, several 
cybersecurity policies governing cybersecurity contractors likely exist as evident by the 
proliferation of cybersecurity contractors within DHS. 
(4) Effectiveness 
Option IV(A) is judged as reducing risk at the medium level. By incorporating a 
strategy that involves reoccurring risk assessment and incident response, as well as 
investigative follow-up of federal facility network intrusions, the DHS is fulfilling its 
obligation to protect the cyber networks of critical infrastructure. However, this strategy 
would only affect roughly a quarter of the facilities owned by GSA and none of the 
commercial facilities GSA leases from the CFS. 
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(5) Time 
Option IV(A) is judged as having a minimal time commitment due to the 
deployment of cybersecurity contractors almost immediately. Additionally, as cited in 
chapter IV, the USSS already possess the knowledge, skills, abilities and equipment to 
conduct cyber intrusion investigations into federal facility BAS network. 
5. Overall Assessment 
Option IV(A) provides the DHS with an immediate solution to a serious 
vulnerability. This recommendation is expected to be widely supported by the DHS, 
implemented quickly and fairly easily. Although the option does not secure all federal 
facility BAS, it does improve security for the systems that are housed on the GSA 
network, protected behind their firewall. This option also allows the FPS to maintain 
operational control of the core mission; to protect federal facilities and the people in 
them. 
B. OPTION IV(B): PERMANENTLY UTILIZING CYBERSECURITY 
CONTRACTORS AND THE SECRET SERVICE 
Option IV(B) is very similar to IV(A) in terms of initial contractor and USSS 
involvement; however, Option IV(B) removes the FPS from the eventual operational role 
analyzed in Option IV(A). Option IV(B) recommends FPS continue to manage 
cybersecurity contractors performing risk assessment and network analysis and leverage 
the cyber intrusion investigation experience of the USSS indefinitely. 
Option IV(B) recommends FPS use contractors and the USSS to perform 
cybersecurity functions and investigations, as analyzed in Option IV(A). Option IV(B) 
recommends that FPS involvement in federal facility cybersecurity be limited to contract 
oversight responsibilities, much like those currently performed for the 15,000 PSOs that 
work in FPS-protected facilities. This option allows FPS to address the concerns raised 
by GAO report 15–6 in December of 2014, while also allowing them to focus on physical 
risk assessments to enhance the security at GSA-owned and leased facilities.  
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Option IV(B) also recommends FPS work with its cybersecurity contractors to 
provide a cyber-physical facility security assessment, which would replace the existing 
facility security assessment. This decision allows FPS to incorporate both cyber and 
physical vulnerabilities in FPS-produced vulnerability assessments, and provide 
mitigation recommendations to federal facility tenants.  
Option IV(B) also eliminates the need for lengthy cybersecurity training for its 
existing employees and removes the cumbersome process associated with federal hiring. 
However, by deferring what some employees may view as their core mission to 
contractors and other law enforcement agencies, morale at FPS would likely be 
diminished. 
1. Analysis against Evaluation Criteria 
Table 5 summarizes the assessment of Option IVB against the analysis 
categories.390 
Table 5.   Option IV(B) Evaluation 
Option DHS Acceptability Compliance Implementation Effectiveness Time 
IV(B) Low Partially Compliant Simple Medium Minimal 
 
(1) DHS Acceptability 
The acceptability rating for Option IV(B) is judged as low, despite the anticipated 
acceptance at DHS headquarters.391 It is likely that Option IV(B) would significantly 
affect morale among the FPS workforce due to the transfer of duties (risk 
assessments/criminal investigations) to outside entities. However, FPS management may 
be accepting of Option IV(B) because FPS still retains control over the proposed (cyber-
physical facility security assessment) process. Furthermore, the author could find no 
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congressional hearing, GAO, CRS, or DHS-OIG report that identified FPS criminal 
investigations as an area of concern; conversely, the FSA process and FPS’ management 
of their contract guard program has been the focus of many inquiries. 
(2) Compliance with Laws, Presidential Executive Orders, and Directives 
Option IV(B) is compliant with FISMA because it provides a plan to secure the 
physical and technical assets that support U.S. critical infrastructure. It is compliant with 
the NCPA because it provides for a cyber-incident response plan. Option IV(B) may be 
partially compliant with HSPD-23 because EINSTEIN may be protecting federal facility 
BAS deployed on the GSA network, but not those housed on contractor-owned networks. 
Option IV(B) is compliant with PPD-21 because it provides cyber incident response 
coordinated through the DHS-contracted cybersecurity professionals and the USSS. 
Option IV(B) is assessed to be compliant with Title 18 Section 1030, which authorizes 
the USSS to conduct criminal investigations into cyber intrusions of federal facility BAS 
networks. 
(3) Implementation 
Implementation of Option IV(B) is judged as simple due to the immediacy with 
which contractors and Secret Service Agents could begin working.392 Although FPS 
would need to quickly educate their contracting officers on cybersecurity contracting 
issues to minimize potential errors, they could leverage existing knowledge in this area 
possessed by others in DHS, such as those resident in the CIO. While policies would 
need to be created, several policies governing cybersecurity contractors likely exist, 
evidenced by the proliferation of cybersecurity contractors within DHS. 
(4) Effectiveness 
Option IV(B) has a medium level of risk reduction.393 By incorporating a strategy 
that involves reoccurring risk assessment and incident response, as well as investigative 
follow-up of federal facility network intrusions, DHS is fulfilling its obligation to protect 
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the cyber networks of critical infrastructure. Additionally, by incorporating a 
cybersecurity vulnerability assessment as a companion piece to the FPS-produced FSA, 
FPS is fulfilling its duties to protect federal facilities. However, this strategy would only 
affect roughly a quarter of the facilities owned by GSA and none of the commercial 
facilities the GSA leases from the CFS. 
(5) Time 
Option IV(B) is judged as having a minimal time commitment, as it deploys 
cybersecurity contractors almost immediately.394 Additionally, as cited in Chapter IV, the 
USSS already possess the knowledge, skills, abilities, and equipment to conduct cyber 
intrusion investigations into federal facility BAS networks. Further, of the option 
eliminates time needed to develop an FPS cybersecurity program. 
2. Overall Assessment 
Option IV(B) provides DHS with an immediate, scalable solution to a serious 
vulnerability. This recommendation is expected to be widely supported by DHS, but not 
within the FPS workforce. Option IV(B) can be implemented quickly and fairly easily. 
Although the option does not secure all federal facility BAS, it does enhance security for 
those systems housed on the GSA network, protected behind their firewall. This option 
also allows the FPS to maintain control of the contractors by performing assessments and 
subsequently incorporating contractor-produced cybersecurity assessments within the 
FPS produced FSA as a companion piece. 
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VII. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, POLICY 
RECOMMENDATIONS, CONCLUSIONS, AND FUTURE EFFORTS 
This chapter offers a comparative analysis of the five options given throughout 
the thesis, judges the findings, and makes recommendations.395 The analysis attempts to 
answer the following primary research question: 
• How can DHS leverage existing federal laws, presidential directives, 
executive orders, and frameworks, and its current cyber and investigative 
capabilities to establish a strategy to secure federal facility building-
automation system networks? 
The following secondary research questions were also examined: 
• If existing resources are not sufficient, what additional resources should be 
obtained to mitigate the risks? 
• How should DHS leverage its components’ law enforcement authorities to 
augment technical cyber defense measures?  
The conclusion identifies the option DHS should use to leverage its existing 
capabilities to secure federal facility BAS, and describes the necessary employment 
efforts. 
A. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
In Chapters II–VI, evaluation criteria were used to assess each policy option 
individually, without comparing the options against each other. The results of the analysis 
are included in Table 6. A new option, named “Preferred Option,” was included in the 
table and assigned ratings consistent with a hypothetical “best choice,” and used to 
compare the five evaluated options.396 
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Table 6.   Comparative Option Evaluation 
OPTION DHS Acceptability Compliance Implementation Effectiveness Time 
I low Not compliant Simple Low Minimal 
II Medium Partially Compliant 
Somewhat 
Difficult Medium Minor 
III Medium Partially Compliant Very Difficult Medium Major 
IV(A) High Partially Compliant Simple Medium Minimal 
IV(B) Low Partially Compliant Simple Medium Minimal 
Preferred 
Option High Compliant Simple High Minimal 
 
 
Because no policy options obtained the  ratings of the preferred option, additional 
analysis was performed to determine which option most closely aligned with the 
attributes of the preferred option. 
Option I (status quo) is the least preferable option, as it achieved the lowest 
ratings in arguably the three important implementation criteria: effectiveness, 
acceptability, and compliance.  
Option II (leveraging existing capabilities) is an acceptable option, but not the 
preferred one. The time investment associated with recruiting new hires, while 
reasonable, would delay the implementation of a strategy to secure federal facility BAS 
for at least a year. 
Option III (establishing a cybersecurity program in FPS) is unacceptable by itself. 
The level of difficulty and the major time investments associated with developing a 
cybersecurity program form the ground up cannot solve the current cybersecurity 
vulnerabilities in federal facilities in a timely manner. 
Option IV(A) (hybrid temporary contractor approach), is the preferred option. 
Option IV(A) can be easily implemented in less than six months and allows for a high 
level of institutional acceptance throughout DHS components. 
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Option IV(B) (hybrid permanent contractor approach) is an acceptable option, but 
not preferred. Despite a time-effective and easily implemented strategy, Option IV(B) 
eliminates the opportunity for FPS law enforcement personnel to be directly involved in 
the strategy. 
Although Option IV(A) is the most preferred option, it is still not fully compliant 
with all laws, E.O.s and directives, as it does not secure the federal facility BAS networks 
controlled by the private contractors who maintain the networks. Once the remaining 
federal facility BAS networks are moved to the GSA network and protected behind the 
GSA firewall, Option IV(A) would attain the highest possible rating for each of the five 
assessment criteria. 
B. CONCLUSION 
Security of federal facilities has evolved greatly since the Oklahoma City 
bombing in 1995. While physical security vulnerabilities have remained a concern for 
federal facilities in the intervening years, cybersecurity has also emerged as a significant 
vulnerability that must be addressed sooner rather than later. The GSA’s efforts to 
modernize their facilities and improve energy efficiency (through Internet-based BAS) 
have also made these facilities vulnerable to a cyber-attack. The consequences of a 
successful attack could range from loss of productivity to loss of life. A recurring theme 
throughout this thesis is that neither DHS nor the GSA has control over all GSA-owned 
federal facility BAS networks. The majority of these networks are controlled by a private 
contractor, and DHS has no visibility into these networks’ cybersecurity measures. 
This thesis has shown that federal facility BAS networks are vulnerable to 
exploitation and, despite current federal laws mandating they be secured, they remain 
remarkably unsecure. DHS has the legal authority and capabilities to protect these 
networks, but neither has yet been leveraged. This thesis offered five policy options for 
DHS leadership to consider as the Department moves forward with their stated goal of 
securing federal facility BAS networks. Each option was weighed against several 
evaluative criteria to include: DHS acceptability, compliance with existing laws, , 
implementation, effectiveness, and time.  
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The comparative analysis findings demonstrated that DHS should embrace and 
implement Option IV(A) by initially utilizing experienced, cleared private contractors to 
perform risk assessments and network analysis of federal facility BAS. Additionally, 
Option IV(A) calls for the USSS to provide incident response to network intrusions, as 
well as subsequent criminal investigations into the discovered intrusions. The USSS is 
the only DHS law enforcement component with both the authority and the technical 
expertise to take on this mission, gained through their work on the Critical Systems 
Protection Program. It is assessed that Option IV(A) will provide the necessary protection 
for federal facility BAS networks until FPS is able to develop and deploy their own 
cybersecurity program. This option provides an almost immediate, cost-effective risk 
mitigation strategy to reduce the vulnerabilities identified in GAO report 15–6. 
C. FUTURE EFFORTS 
DHS should address two areas of concern if they intend to adopt the 
recommended policy option offered in this thesis. Although the areas of concern will not 
prevent the option’s implementation, overcoming them early will increase the chances for 
success. 
First, DHS should request the Office of Management and Budget  increase the 
basic security fee dollar amount that FPS collects to account for the additional services 
FPS will be providing federal facility tenants in the form of cybersecurity. If this is not 
viable, DHS should lobby Congress on behalf of FPS to obtain direct appropriations 
related to the new FPS capability. 
Second, DHS must contend with the lack of government visibility on those 
federal facility BAS networks currently out of the government’s control. DHS should 
establish a dialogue with the GSA to identify if existing contracts between GSA and the 
private contractors that maintain the majority of the BAS networks can be modified to 
allow for their security. 
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